2026-07-23 05:11:33 +00:00
|
|
|
name: Validate observability stack
|
|
|
|
|
|
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1
Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment --
"beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the
operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one
environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and
ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here:
vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV
(own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137)
vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one
TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups
desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment
Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in
infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md.
deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout,
branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service
prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing
distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it
disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and
deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box.
Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the
db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services
are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on
every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared
data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env
and LB config are untouched.
One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh
creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT
revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for
the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap
superuser.
Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently:
- CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and
also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what
once had the prod backup dumping beta.
- The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box
prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it.
- Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would
have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's
traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine,
and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay.
- ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH
target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to
75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now.
- Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on
vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of
unreviewed branches on a VPS.
Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map,
and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box
cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host.
Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security
rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put
a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the
database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
|
|
|
# The observability DOMAIN deploys by hand (`docker compose up -d` on vps1 —
|
|
|
|
|
# the monitoring host, not the beta environment, which runs on vps2 now — plus
|
2026-07-23 05:11:33 +00:00
|
|
|
# the Alloy agent on each node) with no build step, so nothing caught a
|
|
|
|
|
# malformed compose file, a broken dashboard JSON, or an unparseable config
|
|
|
|
|
# until it failed live on the host. This is that missing guard: it parses
|
|
|
|
|
# every YAML/JSON artifact that ships to a node. It does NOT deploy, and
|
|
|
|
|
# deliberately needs no docker CLI (the node:20-bookworm job image doesn't
|
|
|
|
|
# ship one) -- a YAML parse catches the real breakage without it.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# Monorepo port: paths are prefixed observability/, the push trigger is
|
|
|
|
|
# path-filtered to the domain, and workflow_call lets pr-build.yml reuse this
|
|
|
|
|
# as the domain's PR check under its single `gate` required status.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
2026-07-24 04:37:41 +00:00
|
|
|
# The Alloy config (observability/alloy/config.alloy, an HCL-like format) IS
|
|
|
|
|
# validated below -- the static `alloy` binary is downloaded straight from its
|
|
|
|
|
# GitHub release (pinned to the same v1.9.1 the fleet runs; see
|
|
|
|
|
# observability/alloy/docker-compose.agent.yml), no docker CLI needed.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix
The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory
default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's
untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so
alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to
be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and
nobody was told.
Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs):
- 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the
only datasource, so every rule is log-derived.
- Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min
prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so
one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx
burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in
the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5.
- Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel —
#weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify
real subscribers.
- AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence.
- Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway
Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This
matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED]
for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks
perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving.
CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses:
an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions
cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in
the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced.
Postfix supervision:
- The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix
started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing
docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16.
Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships
no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage.
- An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces
address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single
start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then
failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s
instead of re-fataling every 15s forever.
- A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so
"failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours.
- Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and
mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all.
Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/
postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an
address is missing, which made the first version of this check report
status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none.
DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active
postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose
ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@-
instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live.
Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and
app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules
cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
|
|
|
# The alerting config gets a third, stricter step. A YAML parse is not enough
|
|
|
|
|
# for it: an alert rule whose `condition` names a refId that does not exist is
|
|
|
|
|
# perfectly valid YAML, provisions without complaint, and then never fires --
|
|
|
|
|
# a paging path that looks healthy and reaches nobody, which is the exact
|
|
|
|
|
# failure this whole config exists to end. That step also refuses a literal
|
|
|
|
|
# Discord webhook in the repo (it must stay an env reference).
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
2026-07-24 04:37:41 +00:00
|
|
|
# Not validated here: docker-compose *schema* (unknown-key checks, which would
|
|
|
|
|
# need the docker CLI). Add it if the churn warrants the extra tooling.
|
2026-07-23 05:11:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
on:
|
|
|
|
|
workflow_call: {}
|
|
|
|
|
push:
|
|
|
|
|
branches: [main, dev]
|
|
|
|
|
paths: ['observability/**']
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
jobs:
|
|
|
|
|
validate:
|
|
|
|
|
runs-on: docker
|
|
|
|
|
steps:
|
|
|
|
|
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- name: Dashboards are valid JSON
|
|
|
|
|
run: |
|
|
|
|
|
set -euo pipefail
|
|
|
|
|
python3 - <<'PY'
|
|
|
|
|
import json, pathlib, sys
|
|
|
|
|
bad = False
|
|
|
|
|
files = sorted(pathlib.Path("observability/grafana/dashboards").glob("*.json"))
|
|
|
|
|
if not files:
|
|
|
|
|
print("no dashboards found"); sys.exit(1)
|
|
|
|
|
for f in files:
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
json.loads(f.read_text()); print("OK", f)
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001
|
|
|
|
|
print("INVALID JSON", f, "-", e); bad = True
|
|
|
|
|
sys.exit(1 if bad else 0)
|
|
|
|
|
PY
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- name: YAML artifacts parse (compose + loki + grafana provisioning)
|
|
|
|
|
run: |
|
|
|
|
|
set -euo pipefail
|
|
|
|
|
apt-get update -qq && apt-get install -y -qq python3-yaml >/dev/null
|
|
|
|
|
python3 - <<'PY'
|
|
|
|
|
import pathlib, sys
|
|
|
|
|
import yaml
|
|
|
|
|
bad = False
|
|
|
|
|
root = pathlib.Path("observability")
|
|
|
|
|
targets = [
|
|
|
|
|
root / "docker-compose.yml",
|
|
|
|
|
root / "alloy/docker-compose.agent.yml",
|
|
|
|
|
root / "loki/config.yml",
|
|
|
|
|
*sorted((root / "grafana/provisioning").rglob("*.yml")),
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
for f in targets:
|
|
|
|
|
if not f.exists():
|
|
|
|
|
print("MISSING", f); bad = True; continue
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
yaml.safe_load(f.read_text()); print("OK", f)
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001
|
|
|
|
|
print("INVALID YAML", f, "-", e); bad = True
|
|
|
|
|
sys.exit(1 if bad else 0)
|
|
|
|
|
PY
|
2026-07-24 04:37:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- name: Alloy config parses and validates (components, relabel/process wiring)
|
|
|
|
|
run: |
|
|
|
|
|
set -euo pipefail
|
|
|
|
|
apt-get update -qq && apt-get install -y -qq unzip >/dev/null
|
|
|
|
|
curl -sSL -o /tmp/alloy.zip \
|
|
|
|
|
https://github.com/grafana/alloy/releases/download/v1.9.1/alloy-linux-amd64.zip
|
|
|
|
|
unzip -q /tmp/alloy.zip -d /tmp/alloybin
|
|
|
|
|
chmod +x /tmp/alloybin/alloy-linux-amd64
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# `alloy validate` builds the real component graph (catches bad field
|
|
|
|
|
# names, dangling forward_to/receiver refs, malformed relabel/process
|
|
|
|
|
# stages) but doesn't recognize the top-level `livedebugging {}` singleton
|
|
|
|
|
# block as a component -- it only knows named components, even though
|
|
|
|
|
# `alloy run` loads that block fine. Known gap in the `validate`
|
|
|
|
|
# subcommand, not a config error, so strip that one line before checking.
|
|
|
|
|
grep -v '^livedebugging ' observability/alloy/config.alloy > /tmp/config-for-validate.alloy
|
|
|
|
|
/tmp/alloybin/alloy-linux-amd64 validate /tmp/config-for-validate.alloy
|
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix
The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory
default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's
untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so
alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to
be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and
nobody was told.
Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs):
- 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the
only datasource, so every rule is log-derived.
- Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min
prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so
one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx
burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in
the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5.
- Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel —
#weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify
real subscribers.
- AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence.
- Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway
Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This
matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED]
for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks
perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving.
CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses:
an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions
cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in
the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced.
Postfix supervision:
- The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix
started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing
docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16.
Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships
no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage.
- An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces
address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single
start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then
failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s
instead of re-fataling every 15s forever.
- A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so
"failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours.
- Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and
mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all.
Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/
postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an
address is missing, which made the first version of this check report
status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none.
DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active
postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose
ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@-
instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live.
Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and
app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules
cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- name: Alerting config is structurally sound
|
|
|
|
|
run: |
|
|
|
|
|
set -euo pipefail
|
|
|
|
|
apt-get update -qq && apt-get install -y -qq python3-yaml >/dev/null
|
|
|
|
|
python3 - <<'PY'
|
|
|
|
|
import pathlib, re, sys
|
|
|
|
|
import yaml
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
d = pathlib.Path("observability/grafana/provisioning/alerting")
|
|
|
|
|
if not d.is_dir():
|
|
|
|
|
print("no alerting provisioning yet — nothing to check"); sys.exit(0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
docs, bad = {}, []
|
|
|
|
|
for f in sorted(list(d.glob("*.yml")) + list(d.glob("*.yaml"))):
|
|
|
|
|
docs[f] = yaml.safe_load(f.read_text()) or {}
|
|
|
|
|
print("loaded", f)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
receivers, referenced = set(), set()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for f, doc in docs.items():
|
|
|
|
|
# --- contact points ---------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
for cp in doc.get("contactPoints") or []:
|
|
|
|
|
receivers.add(cp.get("name"))
|
|
|
|
|
for r in cp.get("receivers") or []:
|
|
|
|
|
url = str((r.get("settings") or {}).get("url", ""))
|
|
|
|
|
# A real webhook in the repo is a credential leak: anyone with
|
|
|
|
|
# it can post into the ops channel. It must stay an env ref.
|
|
|
|
|
if re.search(r"https://(discord|discordapp)\.com/api/webhooks/", url):
|
|
|
|
|
bad.append(f"{f}: contact point '{cp.get('name')}' has a LITERAL Discord webhook URL — use $DISCORD_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL")
|
|
|
|
|
elif not url.startswith("$"):
|
|
|
|
|
bad.append(f"{f}: contact point '{cp.get('name')}' url is neither an env reference nor empty: {url!r}")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# --- notification policies --------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
def walk(route, where):
|
|
|
|
|
if route.get("receiver"):
|
|
|
|
|
referenced.add(route["receiver"])
|
|
|
|
|
for child in route.get("routes") or []:
|
|
|
|
|
walk(child, where)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for pol in doc.get("policies") or []:
|
|
|
|
|
walk(pol, f)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# --- alert rules ------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
for g in doc.get("groups") or []:
|
|
|
|
|
for rule in g.get("rules") or []:
|
|
|
|
|
title = rule.get("title", "<untitled>")
|
|
|
|
|
where = f"{f}: rule '{title}'"
|
|
|
|
|
refs = {q.get("refId") for q in rule.get("data") or []}
|
|
|
|
|
if not rule.get("uid"):
|
|
|
|
|
bad.append(f"{where}: missing uid (provisioning needs a stable one)")
|
|
|
|
|
if rule.get("condition") not in refs:
|
|
|
|
|
bad.append(f"{where}: condition '{rule.get('condition')}' is not one of {sorted(refs)} — this rule can never fire")
|
|
|
|
|
if not (rule.get("labels") or {}).get("severity"):
|
|
|
|
|
bad.append(f"{where}: no severity label — the notification policy routes on it")
|
|
|
|
|
if not (rule.get("annotations") or {}).get("summary"):
|
|
|
|
|
bad.append(f"{where}: no summary annotation — the Discord message would be blank")
|
|
|
|
|
for q in rule.get("data") or []:
|
|
|
|
|
model = q.get("model") or {}
|
|
|
|
|
upstream = model.get("expression")
|
|
|
|
|
if upstream and upstream not in refs:
|
|
|
|
|
bad.append(f"{where}: query '{q.get('refId')}' reads refId '{upstream}' which does not exist")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
missing = referenced - receivers
|
|
|
|
|
if missing:
|
|
|
|
|
bad.append(f"notification policy routes to undefined receiver(s): {sorted(missing)}")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for b in bad:
|
|
|
|
|
print("::error::" + b)
|
|
|
|
|
print(f"checked {len(docs)} file(s): {len(receivers)} contact point(s), {len(bad)} problem(s)")
|
|
|
|
|
sys.exit(1 if bad else 0)
|
|
|
|
|
PY
|