thermograph/infra/terraform/terraform.tfvars.example

178 lines
8.4 KiB
Text
Raw Normal View History

infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
# Copy to terraform.tfvars and fill in real credentials.
# cp terraform.tfvars.example terraform.tfvars
Decouple Terraform from the app repo; add a GCP host scaffold Content-change pass following the extraction from the app monorepo (this repo now stands alone, sourced via git filter-repo to preserve history): - terraform/variables.tf, secrets.tf, modules/thermograph-host: remove every app-secret Terraform variable (postgres_password, auth_secret, VAPID keys, registry_token, Discord/SMTP creds, ...) and the random_password/random_id generators. The SOPS+age vault (deploy/secrets/*.yaml) is now the sole source of app secrets, rendered at deploy time by deploy/render-secrets.sh; Terraform renders only a non-secret /etc/thermograph-topology.env (sizing, routing) via the renamed thermograph-topology.env.tftpl template. - hosts gains a required app_image_tag field: the host's own checkout is now this infra repo, not the app repo, so there is no "current commit" to derive an image tag from — every host pins one explicitly. repo_url now points at this repo (private; typically needs an embedded read token). - deploy.sh: IMAGE_TAG is now required from the environment instead of derived via `git rev-parse HEAD` of the (now infra-repo) checkout, which would have silently resolved to the wrong or a nonexistent tag. - New terraform/modules/gcp-host: creates a GCE VM + minimal VPC/firewall only, then feeds its IP into the same thermograph-host module every SSH-managed host already uses — one provisioning path regardless of how a host came to exist. var.gcp_hosts defaults to {}, so no google_* resource is planned and the provider is never invoked without it (verified: plan and validate succeed with no GCP credentials configured). - terraform/README.md, ACCESS.md (renamed from INFRA.md), README.md: updated for the new secrets model, the GCP scaffold, and this repo's own identity. Verified: terraform fmt/validate/init clean; plan succeeds against realistic dummy hosts (prod+beta shape) and against a populated gcp_hosts entry (plans 6 resources with no live credentials, confirming the composition wires correctly end to end).
2026-07-22 04:46:05 +00:00
# terraform.tfvars is gitignored (repo_url may carry a credential, and om_rclone_conf
# always does — both land in local state). NEVER commit real values.
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
Decouple Terraform from the app repo; add a GCP host scaffold Content-change pass following the extraction from the app monorepo (this repo now stands alone, sourced via git filter-repo to preserve history): - terraform/variables.tf, secrets.tf, modules/thermograph-host: remove every app-secret Terraform variable (postgres_password, auth_secret, VAPID keys, registry_token, Discord/SMTP creds, ...) and the random_password/random_id generators. The SOPS+age vault (deploy/secrets/*.yaml) is now the sole source of app secrets, rendered at deploy time by deploy/render-secrets.sh; Terraform renders only a non-secret /etc/thermograph-topology.env (sizing, routing) via the renamed thermograph-topology.env.tftpl template. - hosts gains a required app_image_tag field: the host's own checkout is now this infra repo, not the app repo, so there is no "current commit" to derive an image tag from — every host pins one explicitly. repo_url now points at this repo (private; typically needs an embedded read token). - deploy.sh: IMAGE_TAG is now required from the environment instead of derived via `git rev-parse HEAD` of the (now infra-repo) checkout, which would have silently resolved to the wrong or a nonexistent tag. - New terraform/modules/gcp-host: creates a GCE VM + minimal VPC/firewall only, then feeds its IP into the same thermograph-host module every SSH-managed host already uses — one provisioning path regardless of how a host came to exist. var.gcp_hosts defaults to {}, so no google_* resource is planned and the provider is never invoked without it (verified: plan and validate succeed with no GCP credentials configured). - terraform/README.md, ACCESS.md (renamed from INFRA.md), README.md: updated for the new secrets model, the GCP scaffold, and this repo's own identity. Verified: terraform fmt/validate/init clean; plan succeeds against realistic dummy hosts (prod+beta shape) and against a populated gcp_hosts entry (plans 6 resources with no live credentials, confirming the composition wires correctly end to end).
2026-07-22 04:46:05 +00:00
# App secrets (POSTGRES_PASSWORD, THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET, VAPID keys,
# REGISTRY_TOKEN, Discord/SMTP creds, ...) are NOT here anymore -- they live in
# the SOPS+age vault (../deploy/secrets/*.yaml), rendered at deploy time. See
# deploy/secrets/README.md to rotate or add one.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Hosts
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
# Two VPS boxes, keyed by HOST (vps1, vps2) — NOT by environment, because vps2
# alone carries two (prod AND beta). Each host lists its SSH identity once, then
# an `environments` map for whatever runs on it. (The `dev` branch deploys to
# vps1 the same way in reality, but the LAN-laptop `make dev-up` rehearsal is NOT
# managed by Terraform at all.)
hosts = {
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
# vps1: Forgejo (git+CI+registry), Grafana/Loki/Alloy, emigriffith.dev, and the
# `dev` environment. One environment today; the shape still nests it so a
# second one (there is none planned) would never have to fight this host's
# SSH identity.
vps1 = {
host = "75.119.132.91"
Decouple Terraform from the app repo; add a GCP host scaffold Content-change pass following the extraction from the app monorepo (this repo now stands alone, sourced via git filter-repo to preserve history): - terraform/variables.tf, secrets.tf, modules/thermograph-host: remove every app-secret Terraform variable (postgres_password, auth_secret, VAPID keys, registry_token, Discord/SMTP creds, ...) and the random_password/random_id generators. The SOPS+age vault (deploy/secrets/*.yaml) is now the sole source of app secrets, rendered at deploy time by deploy/render-secrets.sh; Terraform renders only a non-secret /etc/thermograph-topology.env (sizing, routing) via the renamed thermograph-topology.env.tftpl template. - hosts gains a required app_image_tag field: the host's own checkout is now this infra repo, not the app repo, so there is no "current commit" to derive an image tag from — every host pins one explicitly. repo_url now points at this repo (private; typically needs an embedded read token). - deploy.sh: IMAGE_TAG is now required from the environment instead of derived via `git rev-parse HEAD` of the (now infra-repo) checkout, which would have silently resolved to the wrong or a nonexistent tag. - New terraform/modules/gcp-host: creates a GCE VM + minimal VPC/firewall only, then feeds its IP into the same thermograph-host module every SSH-managed host already uses — one provisioning path regardless of how a host came to exist. var.gcp_hosts defaults to {}, so no google_* resource is planned and the provider is never invoked without it (verified: plan and validate succeed with no GCP credentials configured). - terraform/README.md, ACCESS.md (renamed from INFRA.md), README.md: updated for the new secrets model, the GCP scaffold, and this repo's own identity. Verified: terraform fmt/validate/init clean; plan succeeds against realistic dummy hosts (prod+beta shape) and against a populated gcp_hosts entry (plans 6 resources with no live credentials, confirming the composition wires correctly end to end).
2026-07-22 04:46:05 +00:00
ssh_user = "agent"
ssh_private_key_path = "~/.ssh/thermograph_agent_ed25519"
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
environments = {
dev = {
role = "dev"
git_branch = "dev" # the only environment that tracks `dev`; beta/prod track `main`
backend_image_tag = "REPLACE_WITH_BACKEND_IMAGE_TAG"
frontend_image_tag = "REPLACE_WITH_FRONTEND_IMAGE_TAG"
# Mesh-only: no public domain, no Caddy/TLS. Reachable at
# http://10.10.0.2:8137 from the WireGuard mesh only.
domain = ""
compose_files = ["docker-compose.yml"]
app_dir = "/opt/thermograph-dev"
workers = 4
app_cpus = 4
db_cpus = 2
db_memory = "8g"
}
}
}
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
# vps2: prod (thermograph.org) AND beta (beta.thermograph.org) as two separate
# Swarm stacks on the SAME 48 GB / 12-core box — plus Centralis, Postfix and
# the backups (not Terraform-managed). ONE shared TimescaleDB instance serves
# both app_dirs below, on separate databases/roles (deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh);
# each environment's db_cpus/db_memory here sizes only that environment's own
# app-container caps, not a second database.
vps2 = {
host = "169.58.46.181"
Decouple Terraform from the app repo; add a GCP host scaffold Content-change pass following the extraction from the app monorepo (this repo now stands alone, sourced via git filter-repo to preserve history): - terraform/variables.tf, secrets.tf, modules/thermograph-host: remove every app-secret Terraform variable (postgres_password, auth_secret, VAPID keys, registry_token, Discord/SMTP creds, ...) and the random_password/random_id generators. The SOPS+age vault (deploy/secrets/*.yaml) is now the sole source of app secrets, rendered at deploy time by deploy/render-secrets.sh; Terraform renders only a non-secret /etc/thermograph-topology.env (sizing, routing) via the renamed thermograph-topology.env.tftpl template. - hosts gains a required app_image_tag field: the host's own checkout is now this infra repo, not the app repo, so there is no "current commit" to derive an image tag from — every host pins one explicitly. repo_url now points at this repo (private; typically needs an embedded read token). - deploy.sh: IMAGE_TAG is now required from the environment instead of derived via `git rev-parse HEAD` of the (now infra-repo) checkout, which would have silently resolved to the wrong or a nonexistent tag. - New terraform/modules/gcp-host: creates a GCE VM + minimal VPC/firewall only, then feeds its IP into the same thermograph-host module every SSH-managed host already uses — one provisioning path regardless of how a host came to exist. var.gcp_hosts defaults to {}, so no google_* resource is planned and the provider is never invoked without it (verified: plan and validate succeed with no GCP credentials configured). - terraform/README.md, ACCESS.md (renamed from INFRA.md), README.md: updated for the new secrets model, the GCP scaffold, and this repo's own identity. Verified: terraform fmt/validate/init clean; plan succeeds against realistic dummy hosts (prod+beta shape) and against a populated gcp_hosts entry (plans 6 resources with no live credentials, confirming the composition wires correctly end to end).
2026-07-22 04:46:05 +00:00
ssh_user = "agent"
ssh_private_key_path = "~/.ssh/thermograph_agent_ed25519"
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
environments = {
prod = {
role = "prod"
git_branch = "main" # this INFRA repo's branch -- see *_image_tag for the app versions
backend_image_tag = "REPLACE_WITH_BACKEND_IMAGE_TAG" # e.g. "sha-abcdef012345" -- from thermograph-backend build-push.yml
frontend_image_tag = "REPLACE_WITH_FRONTEND_IMAGE_TAG" # e.g. "sha-012345abcdef" -- from thermograph-frontend build-push.yml
domain = "thermograph.org" # Caddy TLS in front, app on loopback
compose_files = ["docker-compose.yml"]
# MUST differ from beta's app_dir below -- see variables.tf's file header.
app_dir = "/opt/thermograph"
# "large" is the named size tier for this box (locals.sizes in main.tf) — same
# numbers as hand-picking workers=8/app_cpus=8/db_cpus=4/db_memory="16g" below,
# via the shortcut. The Postgres internal budget scales from db_memory
# automatically (deploy/db/init/20-tuning.sh); no separate tuning edit.
size = "large"
# Self-host the ERA5 archive here: layers docker-compose.openmeteo.yml and
# provisions the rclone mount of the object-storage bucket (om_* vars below).
openmeteo = true
om_data_dir = "/mnt/om-archive"
}
beta = {
role = "beta"
git_branch = "main"
backend_image_tag = "REPLACE_WITH_BACKEND_IMAGE_TAG"
frontend_image_tag = "REPLACE_WITH_FRONTEND_IMAGE_TAG"
# "" ON PURPOSE, unlike prod above: modules/thermograph-host installs a
# FULL /etc/caddy/Caddyfile per environment with a domain set, and only
# ONE environment on a box can own that file. Prod already claims it on
# this host, so beta.thermograph.org's public reverse-proxy has to be a
# site block in vps2's shared, hand-maintained Caddy instead (the same
# pattern deploy/forgejo/docker-stack.yml uses for git.thermograph.org
# on vps1) -- not something this module can render for a second
# environment on the same host.
domain = ""
compose_files = ["docker-compose.yml"]
# MUST differ from prod's app_dir above -- a SECOND checkout on the same
# box, so a `git reset --hard` in one deploy can never yank the tree out
# from under the other's running deploy.
app_dir = "/opt/thermograph-beta"
# Explicit numbers, not a size tier — both styles work on any environment; a
# tier is purely an opt-in shortcut (see prod's `size = "large"` above).
workers = 4
app_cpus = 4
db_cpus = 2
db_memory = "8g"
}
}
}
Have Terraform generate its own internal secrets, with sizing tiers (#239) Terraform generates the secrets that have no external meaning (POSTGRES_PASSWORD, AUTH_SECRET, METRICS_TOKEN, INDEXNOW_KEY) via the random provider instead of requiring the operator to hand-generate and paste each into terraform.tfvars. Each is pinned with a static keepers value (secrets.tf) so apply never regenerates a value already in use - the exact incident class this guards against: every session invalidated, the app<->DB password mismatched. Rotation is now a deliberate keepers edit, never a side effect. postgres_password/auth_secret move from required inputs to optional (default "") - explicit var wins when supplied (seeding an EXISTING live secret during a migration onto Terraform, hop-1 cutover runbook Stage 0), else Terraform generates and owns it. metrics_token/indexnow_key are new: neither existed in Terraform before, both previously left for the app's own fallback generation. VAPID deliberately stays a required, non-generated input - an EC keypair where regeneration breaks every existing push subscription outright, unlike an opaque token. Sizing tiers: a locals.sizes t-shirt map (nano/small/medium/large -> {workers, app_cpus, db_cpus, db_memory}), toward the target Proxmox sizing-tier model (architecture doc SS6) ahead of actually provisioning VMs - Proxmox itself stays deferred; today a tier just sizes container caps on the existing SSH-managed hosts. A host can reference one by name (hosts.<name>. size) or keep hand-picking the four fields, so existing tfvars are unaffected; prod's example now uses size = "large" (identical numbers), beta keeps explicit numbers, and a commented uat example demonstrates the shortcut for a future ephemeral host. Strengthened terraform/README.md's local-state caveat: more Terraform- generated secrets landing in tfstate raises the stakes of the existing never-commit-cleartext-state guidance, not just the sizing. Verified: terraform validate + fmt clean. A real `terraform plan` against fake hosts (prod/beta/uat, mixing size="large"/explicit-numbers/size="nano") resolved every sizing correctly (prod 8/8/4/16g, beta 4/4/2/8g, uat 1/1/1/1g) and planned exactly one instance of each random_password/random_id resource. Applied just those four resources (real generation, -target to avoid touching the fake SSH-only host resources) and re-planned: "No changes" - confirming the keepers pinning holds. Adding an explicit postgres_password override afterward left the random_password resource itself completely untouched (0 replace/destroy), confirming the override path never disturbs the generated resource.
2026-07-21 01:08:57 +00:00
# UAT: an ephemeral, single-node environment — same images/topology shape as
# prod, not prod's scale (design doc §6/§9). Uncomment once a UAT box exists;
# not managed until then. "nano" keeps it cheap since it's destroyed when idle.
# uat = {
# host = "REPLACE_WITH_UAT_VM_IP"
Decouple Terraform from the app repo; add a GCP host scaffold Content-change pass following the extraction from the app monorepo (this repo now stands alone, sourced via git filter-repo to preserve history): - terraform/variables.tf, secrets.tf, modules/thermograph-host: remove every app-secret Terraform variable (postgres_password, auth_secret, VAPID keys, registry_token, Discord/SMTP creds, ...) and the random_password/random_id generators. The SOPS+age vault (deploy/secrets/*.yaml) is now the sole source of app secrets, rendered at deploy time by deploy/render-secrets.sh; Terraform renders only a non-secret /etc/thermograph-topology.env (sizing, routing) via the renamed thermograph-topology.env.tftpl template. - hosts gains a required app_image_tag field: the host's own checkout is now this infra repo, not the app repo, so there is no "current commit" to derive an image tag from — every host pins one explicitly. repo_url now points at this repo (private; typically needs an embedded read token). - deploy.sh: IMAGE_TAG is now required from the environment instead of derived via `git rev-parse HEAD` of the (now infra-repo) checkout, which would have silently resolved to the wrong or a nonexistent tag. - New terraform/modules/gcp-host: creates a GCE VM + minimal VPC/firewall only, then feeds its IP into the same thermograph-host module every SSH-managed host already uses — one provisioning path regardless of how a host came to exist. var.gcp_hosts defaults to {}, so no google_* resource is planned and the provider is never invoked without it (verified: plan and validate succeed with no GCP credentials configured). - terraform/README.md, ACCESS.md (renamed from INFRA.md), README.md: updated for the new secrets model, the GCP scaffold, and this repo's own identity. Verified: terraform fmt/validate/init clean; plan succeeds against realistic dummy hosts (prod+beta shape) and against a populated gcp_hosts entry (plans 6 resources with no live credentials, confirming the composition wires correctly end to end).
2026-07-22 04:46:05 +00:00
# ssh_user = "agent"
# ssh_private_key_path = "~/.ssh/thermograph_agent_ed25519"
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
# environments = {
# uat = {
# role = "uat"
# git_branch = "main"
# backend_image_tag = "REPLACE_WITH_BACKEND_IMAGE_TAG"
# frontend_image_tag = "REPLACE_WITH_FRONTEND_IMAGE_TAG"
# domain = ""
# compose_files = ["docker-compose.yml"]
# app_dir = "/opt/thermograph"
# size = "nano"
# }
# }
Have Terraform generate its own internal secrets, with sizing tiers (#239) Terraform generates the secrets that have no external meaning (POSTGRES_PASSWORD, AUTH_SECRET, METRICS_TOKEN, INDEXNOW_KEY) via the random provider instead of requiring the operator to hand-generate and paste each into terraform.tfvars. Each is pinned with a static keepers value (secrets.tf) so apply never regenerates a value already in use - the exact incident class this guards against: every session invalidated, the app<->DB password mismatched. Rotation is now a deliberate keepers edit, never a side effect. postgres_password/auth_secret move from required inputs to optional (default "") - explicit var wins when supplied (seeding an EXISTING live secret during a migration onto Terraform, hop-1 cutover runbook Stage 0), else Terraform generates and owns it. metrics_token/indexnow_key are new: neither existed in Terraform before, both previously left for the app's own fallback generation. VAPID deliberately stays a required, non-generated input - an EC keypair where regeneration breaks every existing push subscription outright, unlike an opaque token. Sizing tiers: a locals.sizes t-shirt map (nano/small/medium/large -> {workers, app_cpus, db_cpus, db_memory}), toward the target Proxmox sizing-tier model (architecture doc SS6) ahead of actually provisioning VMs - Proxmox itself stays deferred; today a tier just sizes container caps on the existing SSH-managed hosts. A host can reference one by name (hosts.<name>. size) or keep hand-picking the four fields, so existing tfvars are unaffected; prod's example now uses size = "large" (identical numbers), beta keeps explicit numbers, and a commented uat example demonstrates the shortcut for a future ephemeral host. Strengthened terraform/README.md's local-state caveat: more Terraform- generated secrets landing in tfstate raises the stakes of the existing never-commit-cleartext-state guidance, not just the sizing. Verified: terraform validate + fmt clean. A real `terraform plan` against fake hosts (prod/beta/uat, mixing size="large"/explicit-numbers/size="nano") resolved every sizing correctly (prod 8/8/4/16g, beta 4/4/2/8g, uat 1/1/1/1g) and planned exactly one instance of each random_password/random_id resource. Applied just those four resources (real generation, -target to avoid touching the fake SSH-only host resources) and re-planned: "No changes" - confirming the keepers pinning holds. Adding an explicit postgres_password override afterward left the random_password resource itself completely untouched (0 replace/destroy), confirming the override path never disturbs the generated resource.
2026-07-21 01:08:57 +00:00
# }
}
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
# GCP-created hosts — SCAFFOLD ONLY, empty by default, and still keyed one entry
# per ENVIRONMENT (see variables.tf's TODO(cutover) note on gcp_hosts — these are
# hypothetical single-purpose boxes, not vps1/vps2, so they don't need the
# host/environment nesting above). Populate an entry to have Terraform actually
# create a GCP Compute Engine VM (see modules/gcp-host); until then no google_*
# resource is planned and no GCP credentials are needed. Example:
Decouple Terraform from the app repo; add a GCP host scaffold Content-change pass following the extraction from the app monorepo (this repo now stands alone, sourced via git filter-repo to preserve history): - terraform/variables.tf, secrets.tf, modules/thermograph-host: remove every app-secret Terraform variable (postgres_password, auth_secret, VAPID keys, registry_token, Discord/SMTP creds, ...) and the random_password/random_id generators. The SOPS+age vault (deploy/secrets/*.yaml) is now the sole source of app secrets, rendered at deploy time by deploy/render-secrets.sh; Terraform renders only a non-secret /etc/thermograph-topology.env (sizing, routing) via the renamed thermograph-topology.env.tftpl template. - hosts gains a required app_image_tag field: the host's own checkout is now this infra repo, not the app repo, so there is no "current commit" to derive an image tag from — every host pins one explicitly. repo_url now points at this repo (private; typically needs an embedded read token). - deploy.sh: IMAGE_TAG is now required from the environment instead of derived via `git rev-parse HEAD` of the (now infra-repo) checkout, which would have silently resolved to the wrong or a nonexistent tag. - New terraform/modules/gcp-host: creates a GCE VM + minimal VPC/firewall only, then feeds its IP into the same thermograph-host module every SSH-managed host already uses — one provisioning path regardless of how a host came to exist. var.gcp_hosts defaults to {}, so no google_* resource is planned and the provider is never invoked without it (verified: plan and validate succeed with no GCP credentials configured). - terraform/README.md, ACCESS.md (renamed from INFRA.md), README.md: updated for the new secrets model, the GCP scaffold, and this repo's own identity. Verified: terraform fmt/validate/init clean; plan succeeds against realistic dummy hosts (prod+beta shape) and against a populated gcp_hosts entry (plans 6 resources with no live credentials, confirming the composition wires correctly end to end).
2026-07-22 04:46:05 +00:00
# gcp_hosts = {
# gcp-uat = {
# project = "REPLACE_WITH_GCP_PROJECT_ID"
# zone = "us-west1-a"
# machine_type = "e2-medium"
# ssh_user = "agent"
# ssh_public_key_path = "~/.ssh/thermograph_agent_ed25519.pub"
# ssh_private_key_path = "~/.ssh/thermograph_agent_ed25519"
# role = "uat"
# git_branch = "main"
# backend_image_tag = "REPLACE_WITH_BACKEND_IMAGE_TAG"
# frontend_image_tag = "REPLACE_WITH_FRONTEND_IMAGE_TAG"
Decouple Terraform from the app repo; add a GCP host scaffold Content-change pass following the extraction from the app monorepo (this repo now stands alone, sourced via git filter-repo to preserve history): - terraform/variables.tf, secrets.tf, modules/thermograph-host: remove every app-secret Terraform variable (postgres_password, auth_secret, VAPID keys, registry_token, Discord/SMTP creds, ...) and the random_password/random_id generators. The SOPS+age vault (deploy/secrets/*.yaml) is now the sole source of app secrets, rendered at deploy time by deploy/render-secrets.sh; Terraform renders only a non-secret /etc/thermograph-topology.env (sizing, routing) via the renamed thermograph-topology.env.tftpl template. - hosts gains a required app_image_tag field: the host's own checkout is now this infra repo, not the app repo, so there is no "current commit" to derive an image tag from — every host pins one explicitly. repo_url now points at this repo (private; typically needs an embedded read token). - deploy.sh: IMAGE_TAG is now required from the environment instead of derived via `git rev-parse HEAD` of the (now infra-repo) checkout, which would have silently resolved to the wrong or a nonexistent tag. - New terraform/modules/gcp-host: creates a GCE VM + minimal VPC/firewall only, then feeds its IP into the same thermograph-host module every SSH-managed host already uses — one provisioning path regardless of how a host came to exist. var.gcp_hosts defaults to {}, so no google_* resource is planned and the provider is never invoked without it (verified: plan and validate succeed with no GCP credentials configured). - terraform/README.md, ACCESS.md (renamed from INFRA.md), README.md: updated for the new secrets model, the GCP scaffold, and this repo's own identity. Verified: terraform fmt/validate/init clean; plan succeeds against realistic dummy hosts (prod+beta shape) and against a populated gcp_hosts entry (plans 6 resources with no live credentials, confirming the composition wires correctly end to end).
2026-07-22 04:46:05 +00:00
# size = "nano"
# }
# }
# Optional overrides (shown with their defaults):
Decouple Terraform from the app repo; add a GCP host scaffold Content-change pass following the extraction from the app monorepo (this repo now stands alone, sourced via git filter-repo to preserve history): - terraform/variables.tf, secrets.tf, modules/thermograph-host: remove every app-secret Terraform variable (postgres_password, auth_secret, VAPID keys, registry_token, Discord/SMTP creds, ...) and the random_password/random_id generators. The SOPS+age vault (deploy/secrets/*.yaml) is now the sole source of app secrets, rendered at deploy time by deploy/render-secrets.sh; Terraform renders only a non-secret /etc/thermograph-topology.env (sizing, routing) via the renamed thermograph-topology.env.tftpl template. - hosts gains a required app_image_tag field: the host's own checkout is now this infra repo, not the app repo, so there is no "current commit" to derive an image tag from — every host pins one explicitly. repo_url now points at this repo (private; typically needs an embedded read token). - deploy.sh: IMAGE_TAG is now required from the environment instead of derived via `git rev-parse HEAD` of the (now infra-repo) checkout, which would have silently resolved to the wrong or a nonexistent tag. - New terraform/modules/gcp-host: creates a GCE VM + minimal VPC/firewall only, then feeds its IP into the same thermograph-host module every SSH-managed host already uses — one provisioning path regardless of how a host came to exist. var.gcp_hosts defaults to {}, so no google_* resource is planned and the provider is never invoked without it (verified: plan and validate succeed with no GCP credentials configured). - terraform/README.md, ACCESS.md (renamed from INFRA.md), README.md: updated for the new secrets model, the GCP scaffold, and this repo's own identity. Verified: terraform fmt/validate/init clean; plan succeeds against realistic dummy hosts (prod+beta shape) and against a populated gcp_hosts entry (plans 6 resources with no live credentials, confirming the composition wires correctly end to end).
2026-07-22 04:46:05 +00:00
# repo_url = "https://git.thermograph.org/emi/thermograph-infra.git"
# app_port = 8137
# frontend_port = 8080
Decouple Terraform from the app repo; add a GCP host scaffold Content-change pass following the extraction from the app monorepo (this repo now stands alone, sourced via git filter-repo to preserve history): - terraform/variables.tf, secrets.tf, modules/thermograph-host: remove every app-secret Terraform variable (postgres_password, auth_secret, VAPID keys, registry_token, Discord/SMTP creds, ...) and the random_password/random_id generators. The SOPS+age vault (deploy/secrets/*.yaml) is now the sole source of app secrets, rendered at deploy time by deploy/render-secrets.sh; Terraform renders only a non-secret /etc/thermograph-topology.env (sizing, routing) via the renamed thermograph-topology.env.tftpl template. - hosts gains a required app_image_tag field: the host's own checkout is now this infra repo, not the app repo, so there is no "current commit" to derive an image tag from — every host pins one explicitly. repo_url now points at this repo (private; typically needs an embedded read token). - deploy.sh: IMAGE_TAG is now required from the environment instead of derived via `git rev-parse HEAD` of the (now infra-repo) checkout, which would have silently resolved to the wrong or a nonexistent tag. - New terraform/modules/gcp-host: creates a GCE VM + minimal VPC/firewall only, then feeds its IP into the same thermograph-host module every SSH-managed host already uses — one provisioning path regardless of how a host came to exist. var.gcp_hosts defaults to {}, so no google_* resource is planned and the provider is never invoked without it (verified: plan and validate succeed with no GCP credentials configured). - terraform/README.md, ACCESS.md (renamed from INFRA.md), README.md: updated for the new secrets model, the GCP scaffold, and this repo's own identity. Verified: terraform fmt/validate/init clean; plan succeeds against realistic dummy hosts (prod+beta shape) and against a populated gcp_hosts entry (plans 6 resources with no live credentials, confirming the composition wires correctly end to end).
2026-07-22 04:46:05 +00:00
#
# thermograph-infra is a PRIVATE repo, so a host cloning it for the first time
# needs read credentials embedded in repo_url, e.g. a Forgejo deploy token:
# repo_url = "https://deploy:REPLACE_WITH_TOKEN@git.thermograph.org/emi/thermograph-infra.git"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
# Self-hosted Open-Meteo archive (only used by environments with openmeteo = true)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The ERA5 .om archive lives in an object-storage bucket, rclone-mounted on the host.
# om_rclone_conf holds bucket credentials (sensitive; lands in state — keep out of git).
# See deploy/openmeteo/README.md for the bucket + mount setup.
om_bucket_remote = "om-archive:REPLACE_WITH_BUCKET_NAME"
om_vfs_cache_max = "80G"
om_rclone_conf = <<-RCLONE
[om-archive]
type = s3
provider = Cloudflare
endpoint = https://REPLACE.r2.cloudflarestorage.com
access_key_id = REPLACE_WITH_ACCESS_KEY
secret_access_key = REPLACE_WITH_SECRET_KEY
RCLONE