66 lines
3 KiB
Markdown
66 lines
3 KiB
Markdown
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# .claude/hooks — enforcement, not advice
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`CLAUDE.md` files can only ask. These hooks are the part that enforces, and they
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travel with the repo so a session started anywhere in this checkout gets them.
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They are wired up in `.claude/settings.json`.
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| Hook | Event | What it does |
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|---|---|---|
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| `prod-guard.sh` | PreToolUse | Live-host commands: reads run unprompted, mutations ask first |
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| `secrets-guard.sh` | PreToolUse | Denies any direct write to `infra/deploy/secrets/*.yaml` |
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| `lint-after-edit.sh` | PostToolUse | shellchecks an edited `*.sh` and feeds findings back immediately |
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## Why prod-guard exists
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`agent` has passwordless sudo on prod and beta, and the operator's global settings
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allow `Bash(ssh prod:*)` outright. Nothing about `ssh prod 'docker service rm …'`
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goes through a pull request, so CI cannot see it — before this hook, any session in
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any directory could delete production with no prompt.
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**It classifies by allowlist, not blocklist.** Only commands positively recognised as
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read-only are allowed through; everything else asks. A blocklist of dangerous verbs
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is wrong by construction — the first destructive verb nobody thought of sails
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straight through. Being wrong in the "ask" direction costs a keystroke; being wrong
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the other way costs production.
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Beta is guarded as strictly as prod: it serves beta.thermograph.org *and* hosts
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Forgejo, so a destructive command there takes out git, CI and the registry at once.
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The LAN dev box is deliberately unguarded.
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## Changing the classifier
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`is_readonly()` in `prod-guard.sh` splits a command on `&&`, `||`, `;` and `|`, then
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checks each segment's leading word. Redirection to a file, command substitution,
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`sed -i`, and mutating `docker`/`git`/`systemctl` subcommands all count as writes.
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If you add a command to the allowlist, **re-run the test matrix**. There is a
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non-obvious failure mode this already hit once: the loop is fed by
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`printf '%s\n' | sed`, and dropping that trailing newline makes `read` return
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non-zero on the only line, so the loop body never runs and *every* command
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classifies as read-only — a silent, total bypass that still looks like it works.
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Test by piping a payload straight in:
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```bash
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echo '{"tool_name":"Bash","tool_input":{"command":"ssh prod '\''rm -rf /'\''"}}' \
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| .claude/hooks/prod-guard.sh
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# expect: permissionDecision "ask"
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```
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Exit 0 with no output means "no opinion" and the normal permission flow proceeds.
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That is also what happens if `jq` is missing or the script errors, so a bug here
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fails toward the prompt rather than toward silent execution.
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## lint-after-edit needs shellcheck on PATH
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It exits quietly when shellcheck is absent, so it is **inert until installed** — a
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missing local tool must not break editing, and `shell-lint` CI is still the backstop.
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Install the same pinned version CI uses:
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```bash
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VER=v0.11.0
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curl -fsSL "https://github.com/koalaman/shellcheck/releases/download/${VER}/shellcheck-${VER}.linux.x86_64.tar.xz" \
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| tar -xJ --strip-components=1 -C ~/.local/bin "shellcheck-${VER}/shellcheck"
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```
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