thermograph/infra/openbao/policies/tg-host-beta.hcl

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openbao: add a dormant OpenBao backend alongside SOPS Phase 1 of moving the secret store to OpenBao. Nothing is cut over: TG_SECRETS_BACKEND defaults to sops for all three environments, so SOPS remains authoritative until an environment is flipped in a reviewed PR. The reason for the migration is one specific failure class. infra/CLAUDE.md requires that vps1 never hold prod credentials, but that rule is currently enforced by a caller-side shell flag (THERMOGRAPH_SECRETS_SKIP_COMMON) at three call sites. A fourth call site, or one by-hand render, writes both S3 keypairs, the VAPID private key, REGISTRY_TOKEN and the IndexNow/metrics tokens onto the Forgejo CI-runner box and exits 0. policies/tg-host-dev.hcl makes that a 403 instead: dev's identity cannot read the common path at all. Shape: - vps2 only, native systemd (not a container: a Swarm service is circular, and a plain docker run is one `prune -a` from gone), raft storage (2.6.0 deprecated the file backend), static auto-unseal so a reboot cannot block deploys, mesh-only self-signed TLS (not ACME — that would put DNS in the boot chain of the secret store). - AppRole per environment, CIDR-bound, 5-minute tokens. Each environment's secret-id is owned by its own deploy user, which is a boundary that does not exist today since prod and beta both reach the same root-owned age key. - Render still produces the same raw unquoted dotenv: Centralis compares /etc/thermograph.env textually and the Swarm entrypoint parses it by line. The backend dispatch in render-secrets.sh returns early rather than refactoring the shared write path, so the SOPS path stays byte-identical. Verified by rendering dev (12 keys) and prod (32 keys) through it, matching the live hosts. The duplicated write path is noted for consolidation once prod has been on OpenBao for a release cycle. The OpenBao renderer rejects values containing a newline or a shell metacharacter. /etc/thermograph.env is sourced by bash in six places, so such a value is a command-execution path on the deploy host; the SOPS path has always had this hazard and avoids it only because every current value happens to be alphanumeric. Also records that the age keypair is NOT retired by this migration: it is the backup encryption key for every off-box dump (ops-cron.yml:142,197, 30-day retention), so deleting it with the vault files would silently destroy a month of database recoverability. verify-parity.sh is the cutover gate — it renders both backends and diffs them, reporting key names and counts only, never values.
2026-07-30 04:35:20 +00:00
// Policy for BETA's render identity on vps2. Mirror of tg-host-prod.hcl.
//
// Beta legitimately reads the shared set: unlike dev, beta is on vps2 and already
// co-resident with prod, so withholding `shared` from it would buy nothing while
// breaking the render (beta's 24 live keys = beta.yaml's 8 + shared's 16).
path "thermograph/data/common" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "thermograph/metadata/common" {
capabilities = ["read", "list"]
}
path "thermograph/data/env/beta" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "thermograph/metadata/env/beta" {
capabilities = ["read", "list"]
}
path "thermograph/data/env/prod" {
capabilities = ["deny"]
}
path "thermograph/data/env/dev" {
capabilities = ["deny"]
}
path "auth/token/lookup-self" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "auth/token/renew-self" {
capabilities = ["update"]
}