2026-07-26 06:56:38 +00:00
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PORT: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:VCheDw==,iv:u9IC7psxzcsLuuWhU89fUJfVsmCI7lECbjxzKmC/nGM=,tag:ZTG/kG2vSNvUUlItAjsCHg==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_BASE: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Aw==,iv:Pcmbm6D126jncQnmBquZ/t6qMaaUF7UDnQV6q85CsrY=,tag:SGakFybX3TNKAWvFo9gsEw==,type:str]
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TIMESCALEDB_TAG: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:ghewNqRFuYJfBgE=,iv:q1GsQM3QZBW4A95U9NY90RR9WRmPV6miIxGLgLmPTps=,tag:eJARZNyqnJbHhtXXUI1AWw==,type:str]
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DB_MEMORY: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:k2U=,iv:ZRCjRUHbNvVrCdGWqmOoJBtsJLeLVSVm32szpQ23HN4=,tag:KE5jUadHZnKFPis0friNbg==,type:str]
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WORKERS: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:yQ==,iv:6VE9mjS7QLuOWazReqyt1DhAhamkvWSm92B2d/ZCZYo=,tag:hDl1/E11xwUyPVhFNhzOuQ==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_BASE_URL: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:/sOgmM0eCf7dWldK0iZaDWE0W4aN,iv:dpiLeHLanO2zwtMmPMbsqR4aTVaXfT+V2Ux9K8Alh3w=,tag:PDd/L2nt4X750xCKjHnSPw==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_COOKIE_SECURE: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Bw==,iv:dsLcLu126A3d7dTqBgQY1SOvJfKOBT/ye4ucIB4w6B4=,tag:/G7Qvlzb6KKVVjqmn3d/Nw==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_MAIL_BACKEND: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:ryWhCkSdxg==,iv:Lpl1CIjTINV8rF8BW5MHZD4Ji802i96zcyqF3xRMLcY=,tag:I0nbb6IP6LM/Y+KaHjBDpg==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_DISCORD_BOT: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Rw==,iv:o5tr5lQGXFkB6kTJ/dDARBWECDYRdofFlZ7v/HdMe5k=,tag:Lv97fH6u/nIKZlJr5HjbZw==,type:str]
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:IBVel17GKtrW5yzqDjBi,iv:yEPSSYR/Ng9rjSvSl0veNRDPLayF0SvWZ1T8BSY1l50=,tag:hbB4Uo6YluQPgl9XyvgfKw==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_DATABASE_URL: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:KjsSo+IglfY5MhtEsX3HJpExAtBwzmSu3E+O7Y22B2WuIrTKGDxG81WwvQGABYfKVel6kzzv8uKczq1qEtOwHRdMsRI=,iv:VPJNe1GrJa7BeAA/N/fqyBjBF+ciF8btE4j/TwrV3cA=,tag:tkyzkR1LxY8z28bjb0bJ7w==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:ccEQxcNxMEn8/Gf2knQaVMSoBp7BRJ7zWhr9KmawaSMrwHGU7kADDWCoMw==,iv:nDpMHhP0ubjzz2LIY0QMGFLGP1M10zOIJb6pPgri0PI=,tag:+Z2j5XLdV+LuSK7hWf5r0Q==,type:str]
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secrets: vault dev and Centralis; render dev without common.yaml
Brings the last two credential stores under SOPS, so all three environments and
the control plane are managed the same way.
dev.yaml — dev was not "intentionally not wired in", it was broken
The vault README claimed dev had no real secrets. Both halves were false.
Dev needed secrets it did not have: thermograph-dev-daemon-1 has been in a crash
loop, restarting every ~60s with "neither THERMOGRAPH_INTERNAL_TOKEN nor
THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET is set; refusing to start" — so dev has had no Discord
gateway and no job timers. With THERMOGRAPH_BASE_URL unset the app also falls
back to https://thermograph.org, so dev's IndexNow pings and verification links
claimed to be prod. dev.yaml gives it its own generated AUTH_SECRET and a real
base URL, and 12 values total.
And dev already held production credentials: backend-deploy-dev.yml injects
S3_ACCESS_KEY/S3_SECRET_KEY into every dev deploy, and the only provisioned
keypair for that bucket is read-write — on the bucket holding prod's backups.
Dev does not need them; without bucket creds the lake service 503s and history
falls through to the archive. Those workflow lines still need removing.
dev renders dev.yaml ALONE, via THERMOGRAPH_SECRETS_SKIP_COMMON=1. Eleven of
common.yaml's sixteen values are live production credentials, the render is a
plaintext concatenation consumed through env_file:, and dev is the operator's
desktop AND the Forgejo runner executing unreviewed dev-branch code with the
docker socket mounted. An override in dev.yaml would not help — last-wins
governs consumers, but prod's value is still physically a line in the file.
Verified: current renderer leaks 28 lines onto dev including both S3 keypairs
and the VAPID private key; patched gives exactly 12 keys and no prod credential.
Beta's render is byte-identical either way.
centralis.prod.yaml — its own file, its own renderer
/etc/centralis.env was hand-edited, which is how a JSON registry got written
unquoted into a shell-sourced file tonight and silently collapsed three
identities to one. The renderer now owns the file.
It is service- AND environment-scoped, not folded into prod.yaml, because
/etc/thermograph.env is loaded into every container in the app stack. Folding
these in would put CENTRALIS_AUTH_TOKEN and CENTRALIS_TOKENS — which
authenticate an endpoint carrying run_on_host and sql_query(write) — into the
web backend's environment, turning a read-anything bug in the app into a
foothold on the control plane.
Quoting is guaranteed three ways rather than assumed. Critically, `sops -d
--output-type dotenv` emits values verbatim, so reusing the existing render path
would have reproduced tonight's bug exactly. The new function decrypts to JSON
and emits POSIX single-quoted assignments; it then sources its own output in a
clean shell and compares every value before touching /etc; and it refuses to
write unless CENTRALIS_TOKENS parses as a non-empty subject->token object after
sourcing. Tested against 16 hostile values including embedded quotes, newlines
and ;rm -rf /.
Value-identity proven, not asserted: rendered vs live compared as *effective*
values on prod (a textual diff would report a false difference, and would report
a false match if the vault had captured quote characters as part of the value),
plus both env files producing a byte-identical `docker compose config` digest.
9 keys, both token subjects preserved. Nothing deployed.
Note for later: /etc/thermograph.env is also shell-sourced, and survives on raw
dotenv only because none of its 32 current values contains a shell-special
character. It is one quoted secret away from the same bug.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-25 01:10:51 +00:00
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sops:
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age:
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- enc: |
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-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
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2026-07-26 06:56:38 +00:00
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RlovN0RrejVmREY0ckNGaExpNWkvSjcyRW1RCjYvc1IrMWwvdmJGU2g5bU52Mmgw
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SVY1dnFHd0cyNkM1ZWhJaWlIZldzZlEKLS0tIGtLZDRSMS82UjRFRVdZU3J1ckMz
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T0g1WnRUUGFFRTVyMlF6WnZiSEoweEEKPLwcTNiE4s24J0kComnNJj5jXIBRBzMh
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PVktsQm9m1ojaG0hgCZsFaMOOnE5O0Vi41jgG7WWLSNZRaVggvRbJg==
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secrets: vault dev and Centralis; render dev without common.yaml
Brings the last two credential stores under SOPS, so all three environments and
the control plane are managed the same way.
dev.yaml — dev was not "intentionally not wired in", it was broken
The vault README claimed dev had no real secrets. Both halves were false.
Dev needed secrets it did not have: thermograph-dev-daemon-1 has been in a crash
loop, restarting every ~60s with "neither THERMOGRAPH_INTERNAL_TOKEN nor
THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET is set; refusing to start" — so dev has had no Discord
gateway and no job timers. With THERMOGRAPH_BASE_URL unset the app also falls
back to https://thermograph.org, so dev's IndexNow pings and verification links
claimed to be prod. dev.yaml gives it its own generated AUTH_SECRET and a real
base URL, and 12 values total.
And dev already held production credentials: backend-deploy-dev.yml injects
S3_ACCESS_KEY/S3_SECRET_KEY into every dev deploy, and the only provisioned
keypair for that bucket is read-write — on the bucket holding prod's backups.
Dev does not need them; without bucket creds the lake service 503s and history
falls through to the archive. Those workflow lines still need removing.
dev renders dev.yaml ALONE, via THERMOGRAPH_SECRETS_SKIP_COMMON=1. Eleven of
common.yaml's sixteen values are live production credentials, the render is a
plaintext concatenation consumed through env_file:, and dev is the operator's
desktop AND the Forgejo runner executing unreviewed dev-branch code with the
docker socket mounted. An override in dev.yaml would not help — last-wins
governs consumers, but prod's value is still physically a line in the file.
Verified: current renderer leaks 28 lines onto dev including both S3 keypairs
and the VAPID private key; patched gives exactly 12 keys and no prod credential.
Beta's render is byte-identical either way.
centralis.prod.yaml — its own file, its own renderer
/etc/centralis.env was hand-edited, which is how a JSON registry got written
unquoted into a shell-sourced file tonight and silently collapsed three
identities to one. The renderer now owns the file.
It is service- AND environment-scoped, not folded into prod.yaml, because
/etc/thermograph.env is loaded into every container in the app stack. Folding
these in would put CENTRALIS_AUTH_TOKEN and CENTRALIS_TOKENS — which
authenticate an endpoint carrying run_on_host and sql_query(write) — into the
web backend's environment, turning a read-anything bug in the app into a
foothold on the control plane.
Quoting is guaranteed three ways rather than assumed. Critically, `sops -d
--output-type dotenv` emits values verbatim, so reusing the existing render path
would have reproduced tonight's bug exactly. The new function decrypts to JSON
and emits POSIX single-quoted assignments; it then sources its own output in a
clean shell and compares every value before touching /etc; and it refuses to
write unless CENTRALIS_TOKENS parses as a non-empty subject->token object after
sourcing. Tested against 16 hostile values including embedded quotes, newlines
and ;rm -rf /.
Value-identity proven, not asserted: rendered vs live compared as *effective*
values on prod (a textual diff would report a false difference, and would report
a false match if the vault had captured quote characters as part of the value),
plus both env files producing a byte-identical `docker compose config` digest.
9 keys, both token subjects preserved. Nothing deployed.
Note for later: /etc/thermograph.env is also shell-sourced, and survives on raw
dotenv only because none of its 32 current values contains a shell-special
character. It is one quoted secret away from the same bug.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-25 01:10:51 +00:00
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-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
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recipient: age1xx4dzs0dxlwvkv9sjuqzsphl7lfrxannkfken374yu2qvvcte9sqzktqt2
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2026-07-26 06:56:38 +00:00
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lastmodified: "2026-07-25T21:44:03Z"
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mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:ok66XdbCyLyU/2UxQ6Fo63S16r6VETT7Qk/KVJ2b4rrdd4hfOMMAvmUfFmBNkxclxBp+UMOlGJ3XpGRZRzcmWR9o1eXpFlussgDbWHU+KLoIVqAVkUsltVM9aDkg+3dl6/vInftWGw24LbfDh1WhYQ9+OwyKxZntj0sNHAShc8E=,iv:eBTeVtkAv6qcldT0x+zyO2yWVrCm0nhRUJjzaAfxLBM=,tag:BtgIWfkLSoZDcbJML9uO7g==,type:str]
|
secrets: vault dev and Centralis; render dev without common.yaml
Brings the last two credential stores under SOPS, so all three environments and
the control plane are managed the same way.
dev.yaml — dev was not "intentionally not wired in", it was broken
The vault README claimed dev had no real secrets. Both halves were false.
Dev needed secrets it did not have: thermograph-dev-daemon-1 has been in a crash
loop, restarting every ~60s with "neither THERMOGRAPH_INTERNAL_TOKEN nor
THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET is set; refusing to start" — so dev has had no Discord
gateway and no job timers. With THERMOGRAPH_BASE_URL unset the app also falls
back to https://thermograph.org, so dev's IndexNow pings and verification links
claimed to be prod. dev.yaml gives it its own generated AUTH_SECRET and a real
base URL, and 12 values total.
And dev already held production credentials: backend-deploy-dev.yml injects
S3_ACCESS_KEY/S3_SECRET_KEY into every dev deploy, and the only provisioned
keypair for that bucket is read-write — on the bucket holding prod's backups.
Dev does not need them; without bucket creds the lake service 503s and history
falls through to the archive. Those workflow lines still need removing.
dev renders dev.yaml ALONE, via THERMOGRAPH_SECRETS_SKIP_COMMON=1. Eleven of
common.yaml's sixteen values are live production credentials, the render is a
plaintext concatenation consumed through env_file:, and dev is the operator's
desktop AND the Forgejo runner executing unreviewed dev-branch code with the
docker socket mounted. An override in dev.yaml would not help — last-wins
governs consumers, but prod's value is still physically a line in the file.
Verified: current renderer leaks 28 lines onto dev including both S3 keypairs
and the VAPID private key; patched gives exactly 12 keys and no prod credential.
Beta's render is byte-identical either way.
centralis.prod.yaml — its own file, its own renderer
/etc/centralis.env was hand-edited, which is how a JSON registry got written
unquoted into a shell-sourced file tonight and silently collapsed three
identities to one. The renderer now owns the file.
It is service- AND environment-scoped, not folded into prod.yaml, because
/etc/thermograph.env is loaded into every container in the app stack. Folding
these in would put CENTRALIS_AUTH_TOKEN and CENTRALIS_TOKENS — which
authenticate an endpoint carrying run_on_host and sql_query(write) — into the
web backend's environment, turning a read-anything bug in the app into a
foothold on the control plane.
Quoting is guaranteed three ways rather than assumed. Critically, `sops -d
--output-type dotenv` emits values verbatim, so reusing the existing render path
would have reproduced tonight's bug exactly. The new function decrypts to JSON
and emits POSIX single-quoted assignments; it then sources its own output in a
clean shell and compares every value before touching /etc; and it refuses to
write unless CENTRALIS_TOKENS parses as a non-empty subject->token object after
sourcing. Tested against 16 hostile values including embedded quotes, newlines
and ;rm -rf /.
Value-identity proven, not asserted: rendered vs live compared as *effective*
values on prod (a textual diff would report a false difference, and would report
a false match if the vault had captured quote characters as part of the value),
plus both env files producing a byte-identical `docker compose config` digest.
9 keys, both token subjects preserved. Nothing deployed.
Note for later: /etc/thermograph.env is also shell-sourced, and survives on raw
dotenv only because none of its 32 current values contains a shell-special
character. It is one quoted secret away from the same bug.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-25 01:10:51 +00:00
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unencrypted_suffix: _unencrypted
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version: 3.13.2
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