thermograph/observability/README.md

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# Thermograph — observability
Fleet-wide log aggregation for [Thermograph](https://thermograph.org): a central
**Grafana + Loki** stack, fed by a **Grafana Alloy** agent on every node, all
over the private WireGuard mesh. This replaces the old in-repo
`scripts/dashboard.py` (an SSH-tailed, single-host, metrics-endpoint view) with a
persistent, queryable, fleet-wide log store and UI.
```
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
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vps1 (10.10.0.2) vps2 (10.10.0.1) desktop (10.10.0.3)
┌───────────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│ Loki ◀───── Alloy │◀──wg0───┤ Alloy agent │◀─wg0──┤ Alloy agent │
│ Grafana (Caddy) │ │ prod + beta (Swarm) │ │ (no app │
│ dev (compose) │◀──wg0───┤ Postfix, backups │ │ stack) │
│ Forgejo, portfolio │ └───────────────────────┘ └──────────────┘
└───────────────────────┘ docker+caddy+app logs ships no app logs
central store + UI + dev
```
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
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- **vps1** is the monitoring host: Loki, Grafana, Forgejo, the portfolio site,
and the **dev** environment (its own compose project, mesh-only, no public
DNS). It does **not** run the beta *environment* — that now lives on vps2 — so
any older doc that says "beta" meaning *this box* is stale and needs reading
as vps1.
- **vps2** runs **prod and beta** as two separate Docker Swarm stacks
(`thermograph`, `thermograph-beta`), plus Postfix and backups. One shared
TimescaleDB serves both, on separate roles/databases.
- **desktop** hosts no Thermograph environment now (AI-model hosting + flex
Swarm-worker capacity instead), so it ships no app logs.
- **Loki** stores logs (filesystem, 30-day retention). Listens on the mesh IP
`10.10.0.2:3100` — never public.
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
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- **Grafana** is the UI, fronted by vps1's Caddy at `dashboard.thermograph.org`,
login via **Google SSO** (with a break-glass local admin); Loki is not exposed.
- **Alloy** runs on each node and ships three sources to Loki: every Docker
container's stdout/stderr, Caddy's host access logs, and the app's structured
JSON logs (`errors`/`access`/`audit` `*.jsonl`, parsed so `level`/`tag`/`phase`
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
become labels). Every line now carries two distinct labels: `host`
(`prod`|`beta`|`dev`) is the ENVIRONMENT, derived *per source* (a container's
stack prefix, the Caddy access-log filename, or which `applogs` volume a JSON
line came out of) — because vps2 alone carries two environments, and one
node-wide value would have stamped every beta container and log line as
`prod`. `node` (`vps1`|`vps2`|`desktop`) is the MACHINE, stamped externally on
everything an agent ships. See `alloy/config.alloy` for exactly how `host` is
derived per source.
## Layout
| Path | What |
|------|------|
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
| `docker-compose.yml` | the central Loki + Grafana stack (runs on vps1) |
| `loki/config.yml` | Loki config (filesystem, retention) |
| `grafana/provisioning/` | auto-wired Loki datasource + dashboard provider |
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
| `grafana/provisioning/alerting/` | contact point, notification policy and alert rules — see [Alerting](#alerting) |
| `grafana/dashboards/thermograph-logs.json` | the fleet-logs dashboard |
| `alloy/config.alloy` | the per-node collector config |
| `alloy/docker-compose.agent.yml` | runs the Alloy agent on a node |
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
| `alloy/docker-compose.agent.beta.yml` | overlay adding beta's `applogs` mount — vps2 only |
| `caddy-grafana.conf` | vps1 Caddy site block for the Grafana UI |
## Deploy
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
> ### ⚠️ Merging is not deploying
>
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
> `/opt/observability` on vps1 (and vps2) is a checkout of the **archived**
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
> `emi/thermograph-observability` repo. It can never `git pull` again — the
> content now lives here, in the mono repo, under `observability/`. A previous
> observability PR merged and had **zero live effect** for exactly this reason.
>
> Until someone re-points those checkouts at the mono repo, every change here
> ships by hand: back up the live file with a UTC-timestamped suffix, `scp` the
> new one up, `sudo cp` it into place, restart the specific container. Use
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
> `sudo docker restart <container>` — **not `docker compose`**, which on vps2
> demands a `GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD` it has no `.env` to interpolate from
> (vps2 only runs the Alloy agent — there's no Grafana there to configure).
> (vps1's stack does have an `.env`, so compose works there — and is required
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
> when a change adds a new environment variable, since `docker restart` alone
> will not pick one up.)
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
### 1. Central stack (on vps1)
```bash
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
# on vps1 (75.119.132.91):
git clone <this repo> thermograph-observability && cd thermograph-observability
cp .env.example .env # set GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD
docker compose up -d # Loki on 10.10.0.2:3100 + 127.0.0.1:3100; Grafana on 127.0.0.1:3000
```
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
Expose the Grafana UI: point `dashboard.thermograph.org` at vps1, append
`caddy-grafana.conf` to `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile`, `systemctl reload caddy`.
### Google SSO (Grafana + Forgejo)
Both the dashboard and Forgejo log in with Google. Create **one** Google Cloud
OAuth 2.0 Client (type: *Web application*) and register both redirect URIs:
- Grafana: `https://dashboard.thermograph.org/login/google`
- Forgejo: `https://git.thermograph.org/user/oauth2/google/callback`
**Grafana:** put the client id/secret in `.env`, set `OAUTH_ENABLED=true`, and
`docker compose up -d`. Login is locked to pre-provisioned accounts
(`allow_sign_up=false`), so provision your email as an admin once:
```bash
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
# on vps1, after the stack is up (uses the break-glass admin creds from .env):
curl -s -u admin:"$GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/admin/users \
-d '{"name":"you","login":"you@gmail.com","email":"you@gmail.com","password":"'"$(openssl rand -base64 24)"'"}'
# then make that user a Grafana admin (org role Admin + server admin) via the UI
# or /api/org/users; the Google login matches on email.
```
**Forgejo:** add the Google auth source (once, as a Forgejo admin):
```bash
docker exec -u git <forgejo-container> forgejo admin auth add-oauth \
--name google --provider openidConnect \
--key "<CLIENT_ID>" --secret "<CLIENT_SECRET>" \
--auto-discover-url https://accounts.google.com/.well-known/openid-configuration
```
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
### 2. Alloy agent (on vps1 and vps2)
`ALLOY_NODE` names the MACHINE now, not the environment — vps2 alone runs two
environments (prod and beta), so a node name can no longer stand in for a
`host` value. `ALLOY_ENV` supplies the default environment label for anything
on that node not attributable to a specific stack (Forgejo, Grafana, the
portfolio site). `APPLOGS_VOLUME` is the node's primary `applogs` volume; vps2
additionally needs `BETA_APPLOGS_VOLUME` and a second compose file, since it
carries both environments' structured logs side by side.
Every node pushes to Loki over the mesh IP — a containerized agent can't reach
the host's `127.0.0.1`, but it can reach vps1's wg0 address at
`10.10.0.2:3100`.
```bash
cd thermograph-observability/alloy
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
# vps1 (dev + Forgejo + the monitoring stack itself):
ALLOY_NODE=vps1 ALLOY_ENV=dev APPLOGS_VOLUME=thermograph-dev_applogs \
LOKI_URL=http://10.10.0.2:3100/loki/api/v1/push \
docker compose -f docker-compose.agent.yml up -d
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
# vps2 (prod + beta) — note the SECOND file, adding beta's log volume:
ALLOY_NODE=vps2 ALLOY_ENV=prod APPLOGS_VOLUME=thermograph_applogs \
BETA_APPLOGS_VOLUME=thermograph-beta_applogs \
LOKI_URL=http://10.10.0.2:3100/loki/api/v1/push \
docker compose -f docker-compose.agent.yml -f docker-compose.agent.beta.yml up -d
```
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
The mesh must already be up (see the main repo's `deploy/swarm/` / `INFRA.md`);
Swarm is **not** required for the agent itself — it talks plain HTTP over wg0.
<!-- TODO(cutover): desktop no longer runs a Thermograph app stack and ships no
app logs, but it isn't clear whether it still runs an Alloy agent at all
(for its AI-model / flex-worker container logs) or has been dropped from
the fleet entirely. `ALLOY_NODE=desktop` is still a valid value in
alloy/config.alloy and docker-compose.agent.yml, but no desktop deploy
command is given here — confirm and fill in once decided. -->
## Verify
```bash
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
# From any mesh node, confirm Loki is receiving from every environment
# (host = prod|beta|dev; a separate node/vps1|vps2|desktop label exists too):
curl -s 'http://10.10.0.2:3100/loki/api/v1/label/host/values' # -> {"data":["beta","dev","prod"]}
# Then open Grafana → the "Thermograph — Fleet Logs" dashboard.
```
## The dashboard
`Thermograph — Fleet Logs` (auto-provisioned), with a `Node` selector:
log volume by service, app error rate by tag, upstream 429 count, Caddy 5xx
count, a per-node notifier-liveness indicator (from the heartbeat log), recent app errors, and a live all-container
tail. Edit it in Grafana and re-export the JSON here to version a change.
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
<!-- TODO(cutover): the dashboard JSON isn't in this pass's scope, but check
whether its "Node" selector still means `node` (the machine) now that the
label has that meaning, or whether some panels actually want to filter by
`host` (the environment) instead — vps2 mixes prod and beta under one
node value, so a machine-only selector can no longer isolate one
environment there. -->
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
## Alerting
Provisioned from `grafana/provisioning/alerting/`, mounted read-only into Grafana
by the compose file, so **the repo is the only durable path** — as with the
dashboards, edits made in the Grafana UI are overwritten on the next provision.
Every rule is **LogQL**, because there is no Prometheus in the fleet: Loki is the
only datasource, so every signal is derived from log lines.
### Where alerts go: Discord, not email
`#ops-alerts` (Owners category, private to Emi and Jin) via Grafana's native
Discord contact point. Deliberately **not email**:
- Grafana's factory default pointed at the literal string `<example@email.com>`
a paging path that had never delivered a message to anyone.
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
- vps1's Grafana relays SMTP through **vps2's** Postfix at `10.10.0.1:25` (see
`docker-compose.override.yml` on vps1). Email alerts therefore travel through
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
the box most likely to be on fire, and vanish exactly when they matter.
- Discord is off-estate, works when prod is dead, and reaches a phone.
`#ops-alerts` is a new dedicated channel, not one of the existing ones: the
`#dev` / `#uat` / `#prod` channels are the *product's* alert-subscription output
(real deliveries — routing ops noise there would corrupt the evidence), and
`#notes` / `#staff-chat` are for humans.
The webhook URL is a secret and is **not in this repo**: it comes from
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
`DISCORD_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` in vps1's gitignored `.env`, which compose passes to
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
Grafana and which Grafana interpolates when reading the provisioning file.
Grafana refuses to start if it is unset.
### The rules
| Rule | Fires when | Severity |
|------|-----------|----------|
| `ProdEdgeDark` | zero prod Caddy log lines in 15m — site dark, or the log pipeline is broken | critical |
| `ProdHealthzFailing` | any non-200 on `/healthz` in 10m | critical |
| `ProdHTTP5xxBurst` | ≥10 prod 5xx in 10m | critical |
| `ProdHTTP5xxElevated` | ≥25 prod 5xx accumulated over 6h (the error-budget alarm) | warning |
| `ProdUnhandledExceptions` | ≥3 app `tag=http.error` in 30m | warning |
| `NotifierHeartbeatMissingProd` | no `tag=heartbeat` line from prod in 20m | critical |
| `NotifierHeartbeatMissingBeta` | same, on beta | warning |
| `ProdWebContainerSilent` | `thermograph_web` logged nothing in 30m | critical |
| `ProdDbContainerSilent` | `thermograph_db` logged nothing in 2h | critical |
| `ProdFrontendContainerSilent` | `thermograph_frontend` logged nothing in 30m | warning |
| `ProdWorkerContainerSilent` | `thermograph_worker` logged nothing in 2h | warning |
| `AlertingWatchdog` | always — one Discord message per day | watchdog |
Every threshold was backtested against real Loki data; the working is written out
in the comments of `rules-prod.yml`, next to the rule it justifies. Read those
before changing a number.
`AlertingWatchdog` is the dead-man's switch and fires permanently by design. **Its
value is its absence**: nothing can report its own death, so if `#ops-alerts` has
been silent for more than a day, alerting is broken rather than the estate
healthy. Set `isPaused: true` on it to opt out of that guarantee.
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
### Deploying an alerting change to vps1
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
Grafana already mounts `./grafana/provisioning` read-only, so new files under
`alerting/` need no compose change — but the **first** deploy does, because it
introduces `DISCORD_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL`, and `docker restart` will not pick up a
new environment variable.
```bash
# run from the mono-repo root
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
VPS1="agent@75.119.132.91" # the monitoring host — NOT the beta environment,
# which now runs on vps2; don't repoint this at it.
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
SSH="ssh -i ~/.ssh/thermograph_agent_ed25519"
TS=$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
# 1. put the secret in vps1's .env (once), then confirm it took:
$SSH $VPS1 "grep -q '^DISCORD_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL=' /opt/observability/.env && echo present || echo MISSING"
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
# 2. back up the live compose file, stage the new files, move them into place:
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
$SSH $VPS1 "sudo cp -a /opt/observability/docker-compose.yml /opt/observability/docker-compose.yml.$TS \
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
&& rm -rf /tmp/obs-stage && mkdir -p /tmp/obs-stage/alerting"
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
scp -i ~/.ssh/thermograph_agent_ed25519 observability/docker-compose.yml $VPS1:/tmp/obs-stage/
scp -i ~/.ssh/thermograph_agent_ed25519 observability/grafana/provisioning/alerting/*.yml $VPS1:/tmp/obs-stage/alerting/
$SSH $VPS1 "sudo mkdir -p /opt/observability/grafana/provisioning/alerting \
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
&& sudo cp /tmp/obs-stage/docker-compose.yml /opt/observability/ \
&& sudo cp /tmp/obs-stage/alerting/*.yml /opt/observability/grafana/provisioning/alerting/"
# 3. recreate Grafana so it reads the new env var AND the new provisioning.
# `docker restart` is NOT enough here — it will not pick up a new env var.
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
$SSH $VPS1 "cd /opt/observability && docker compose up -d grafana"
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
```
Subsequent rule-only changes are just step 2 plus
`sudo docker restart observability-grafana-1` — no compose needed, because no
new environment variable is involved.
**Rollback:** the provisioning files are additive. To back the whole thing out,
`sudo rm -rf /opt/observability/grafana/provisioning/alerting`, restore
`docker-compose.yml.<timestamp>`, and `docker compose up -d grafana`. Grafana
falls back to its default (email → `<example@email.com>`) root policy — i.e. no
alerting, which is where this started.
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
Alerting lives on **vps1 only** — vps2 (prod + beta) and dev only run Alloy
agents, not Grafana, so nothing in `alerting/` ever ships to them, even though
dev happens to share a box with vps1's Grafana.
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
### Verify alerting
```bash
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
# on vps1, after deploying and restarting Grafana:
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
GFP=$(grep '^GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD=' /opt/observability/.env | cut -d= -f2-)
WH=$(grep '^DISCORD_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL=' /opt/observability/.env | cut -d= -f2-)
# 1. all 12 rules loaded and healthy (health should be "ok", never "error"):
curl -s -u admin:"$GFP" localhost:3000/api/prometheus/grafana/api/v1/rules \
| python3 -c 'import json,sys; [print(r["name"], r["state"], r["health"]) for g in json.load(sys.stdin)["data"]["groups"] for r in g["rules"]]'
# 2. the root policy points at Discord, NOT grafana-default-email:
curl -s -u admin:"$GFP" localhost:3000/api/v1/provisioning/policies
# 3. force a real message into #ops-alerts (does not persist anything):
curl -s -u admin:"$GFP" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X POST localhost:3000/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/api/v1/receivers/test \
-d '{"receivers":[{"name":"t","grafana_managed_receiver_configs":[{"name":"t","type":"discord","settings":{"url":"'"$WH"'"}}]}]}'
# -> {"receivers":[{... "status":"ok"}]} and a message in #ops-alerts.
```
The webhook URL is redacted (`[REDACTED]`) by
`GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points`, so you **cannot** confirm
interpolation by reading it back — the only proof is a message actually arriving
in `#ops-alerts`. A contact point holding the literal string
`$DISCORD_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` looks completely healthy from the API and pages
nobody.
### The leftover default contact point
Grafana's built-in `grafana-default-email``<example@email.com>` receiver is
created by Grafana's *default Alertmanager config*, not by provisioning, and its
uid is the empty string. `deleteContactPoints` matches on uid, so **provisioning
cannot remove it** (`DELETE /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points/` with an empty
uid returns 404 — verified).
Provisioning the notification policy already makes it inert: nothing routes there
any more, so it cannot receive anything. Actually deleting the row is a one-time
manual step, and only works *after* this config is live (Grafana refuses to
delete a receiver a policy still references). Either use the UI — Alerting →
Contact points → `grafana-default-email` → Delete — or:
```bash
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
# on vps1. Reads the running Alertmanager config, drops the one receiver,
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
# writes it back. Verified against Grafana 11.6.1 (returns 202).
GFP=$(grep '^GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD=' /opt/observability/.env | cut -d= -f2-)
AM=localhost:3000/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/api/v1/alerts
curl -s -u admin:"$GFP" $AM > /tmp/am.json
python3 -c "
import json; d=json.load(open('/tmp/am.json')); c=d['alertmanager_config']
c['receivers']=[r for r in c['receivers'] if r['name']!='grafana-default-email']
json.dump(d, open('/tmp/am2.json','w'))"
curl -s -u admin:"$GFP" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -X POST --data @/tmp/am2.json $AM
rm -f /tmp/am.json /tmp/am2.json
```
This is cosmetic — leaving it costs nothing but a confusing row in the UI.
## Notes / follow-ups
- **Loki is mesh-only** by design; only Grafana (with auth) is public.
- Alloy reads the Docker socket read-only to discover containers.
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
- Retention is 30 days on vps1's disk — bump `loki/config.yml` if you want more.
- The app emits a `tag=heartbeat` line for the subscription notifier every
~15m; the dashboard's "Notifier alive?" panel turns red if a node misses it.
Extend the same `audit.log_heartbeat()` to any future background daemon.
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
### Known gaps
- **Alloy can silently stop tailing a container after Swarm replaces the task.**
Observed on prod on 2026-07-24: `thermograph_worker` was `1/1`, healthy, and
writing ~19 lines per 10 minutes to its own docker log, yet not one line had
reached Loki since 04:43Z — a 13½-hour hole nobody could see, because nothing
was watching. `ProdWorkerContainerSilent` now catches exactly this.
What localises it to Alloy rather than the app: prod's `tag=heartbeat` lines
kept arriving in *every* 20-minute window throughout, and those come from a
different Alloy source (`loki.source.file` on `/applogs`) than the container
stdout (`loki.source.docker`). One source went deaf, the other did not.
The workaround is `sudo docker restart alloy-alloy-1` on the affected node;
the fix is probably an explicit `refresh_interval` on `discovery.docker` plus
a look at whether `loki.source.docker` re-resolves targets. Not root-caused.
- **Some services are too quiet to alert on.** `thermograph_daemon` (23 log
lines/24h), `thermograph_autoscaler` (1) and `thermograph_autoscaler-lake` (2)
have a healthy floor indistinguishable from dead, and `thermograph_lake` is
bursty ETL with legitimate idle gaps. Giving each one an
`audit.log_heartbeat()` line would make all four alertable with the same
pattern the notifier already uses. That is the single highest-value follow-up
here.
- **Grafana cannot alert on its own death** — that is what `AlertingWatchdog`
is for, but it is a *manual* dead-man's switch: it relies on somebody noticing
that the daily message stopped. A real external watchdog (an uptime pinger
hitting a Grafana endpoint from off-estate) would close this properly.
infra: split the estate into vps1/vps2, moving beta next to prod and dev onto vps1 Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment -- "beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here: vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV (own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137) vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md. deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout, branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box. Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env and LB config are untouched. One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap superuser. Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently: - CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what once had the prod backup dumping beta. - The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it. - Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine, and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay. - ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to 75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now. - Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of unreviewed branches on a VPS. Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map, and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host. Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the database and the filesystem.
2026-07-25 22:01:29 +00:00
- **vps1 runs a `docker-compose.override.yml` that is not in this repo**, wiring
Grafana's SMTP to vps2's Postfix. It should be mirrored into the tracked
observability: add the estate's first alerting; supervise Postfix The estate had zero alert rules. The only contact point was Grafana's factory default pointing at the literal string <example@email.com>, and beta's untracked compose override routed Grafana's SMTP at prod's Postfix — so alerts, had any existed, would have been delivered by the box most likely to be on fire. Prod served 86 5xx in 24h including five /healthz failures and nobody was told. Alerting (deploys to beta, which is where Grafana runs): - 12 Loki-based rules. There is no Prometheus in this estate and Loki is the only datasource, so every rule is log-derived. - Thresholds come from a 24h backtest that happens to contain a real ~20min prod outage at 04:20Z. Absolute counts, not ratios: prod runs ~7 req/min, so one bad request is 1.4% and a ratio alert would scream all night. The 5xx burst rule fires on the outage's 45 and 22 buckets and on nothing else in the day; the largest benign bucket all day was 5. - Routed to a new private #ops-alerts channel, not to any existing channel — #weather-events, #announcements and #prod are product surfaces that notify real subscribers. - AlertingWatchdog is a dead-man's switch; its value is its absence. - Delivery is proven, not assumed: the rules were provisioned into a throwaway Grafana against beta's live Loki and a real alert arrived in Discord. This matters because GET /api/v1/provisioning/contact-points returns [REDACTED] for the URL — a contact point holding an uninterpolated env var looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody. The only proof is a message arriving. CI gains a structural check, because the existing one only proves YAML parses: an alert rule whose condition names a missing refId is valid YAML, provisions cleanly, and never fires. It also hard-fails on a literal Discord webhook in the repo. Verified against all three breakages deliberately introduced. Postfix supervision: - The 13h outage was a boot-ordering race, not a Docker renumbering: postfix started at 08:09:49, wg0 came up at :51, postfix fataled at :52 on a missing docker_gwbridge address, and dockerd did not finish starting until 08:10:16. Stock postfix@.service is ordered only After=network-online.target and ships no Restart=, so one lost race became a permanent outage. - An ExecStartPre gate now blocks up to 60s until every inet_interfaces address actually exists, which absorbs the transient case inside a single start attempt. That makes bounded retry correct: 5 attempts in 600s, then failed — a genuinely broken config reaches a visible failed state in ~100s instead of re-fataling every 15s forever. - A 5-minute watchdog timer retries indefinitely and runs reset-failed, so "failed" still self-heals. Worst case is ~5 minutes, not 13 hours. - Wants=, not Requires=: a dockerd failure must not take down the loopback and mesh listeners that do not depend on Docker at all. Health checks must read config with `postconf -c`, never postmulti/postqueue/ postfix — those three RESOLVE inet_interfaces and so fatal precisely when an address is missing, which made the first version of this check report status=ok bound=0/0. A health check that fails open is worse than none. DEPLOY.md carries the monitoring contract, including that systemctl is-active postfix is a known-false signal: postfix.service is a wrapper whose ExecStart=/bin/true, so it reports active forever while the real postfix@- instance is failed with zero listeners. Reproduced live. Known gap, documented not fixed: Alloy ships Docker stdout, Caddy files and app JSONL, not journald — so no Postfix line reaches Loki and the mail rules cannot fire until loki.source.journal is added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
2026-07-24 20:19:19 +00:00
compose file or deleted; alerting no longer depends on it.