web/app.py started two long-lived background jobs under a leader election: the
Discord gateway bot and an APScheduler. Both are stateful I/O loops -- reconnect,
RESUME, heartbeat, backoff, interval timers -- living inside an async web app
that also has to serve requests. This moves them into a single Go binary.
Go owns ONLY the stateful I/O. It owns no climate or grading logic: anything
needing data calls back into Python over a new internal-only HTTP surface
(/internal/discord/grade, /internal/jobs/warm-cities, /internal/jobs/indexnow).
Grading depends on polars and the parquet cache; reimplementing it in Go would
make the bot's grades drift from the API's, and the slash-command path
deliberately shares one grade builder so the two can never disagree. The grade
route returns gateway-ready JSON -- including the ephemeral-flag drop that
discord_bot.py used to do -- and Go relays those bytes verbatim without parsing
the embed.
Packaging: the binary is built by a golang:1.26 stage in the backend Dockerfile
and shipped in the SAME image, run as a second compose service off the SAME tag.
The daemon and backend share the /internal/* contract, so they must never skew
versions; one image makes that structural rather than a convention. Its
entrypoint bypasses entrypoint.sh -- the backend owns alembic, and two racing
migrators is a real hazard.
replicas: 1 in the Swarm stack is load-bearing. Discord permits exactly one
gateway connection per bot token; the pin replaces core/singleton.claim_leader
for this workload. update_config uses order: stop-first, since start-first would
briefly run two gateways. autoscale.sh targets ${STACK_NAME}_web only, so it
cannot scale this.
Security: the internal routes compare the token with hmac.compare_digest and the
whole router 404s when THERMOGRAPH_INTERNAL_TOKEN is unset -- fail closed, never
default open. Caddy only routes /api/*, /digest and /discord/interactions to the
backend, so /internal/* was never publicly reachable; the token is defence in
depth. The router mounts before the catch-all frontend proxy so /internal/*
cannot fall through to it. The daemon refuses to start without the token.
Behaviour preserved from the Python, with the reasoning carried into the Go
comments: non-privileged intents (no MESSAGE_CONTENT, so no portal review);
fatal close codes 4004/4010-4014 stop rather than loop; the bot-author and
self-author mention-loop guard; allowed_mentions locked to {"parse":[],
"replied_user":true} so a crafted query cannot turn a reply into an @everyone
ping; the first cron tick deferred one full interval rather than firing at boot,
since warm-cities already runs at deploy time; and no overlapping warm-cities
run, which would double-spend the archive-fetch quota.
Two deliberate improvements over the Python. A close intended for RESUME now
uses 4000 rather than 1000 -- Discord invalidates a session closed 1000/1001, so
the Python's default close silently defeated its own resume. And MESSAGE_CREATE
is handled on a bounded worker pool rather than an unbounded thread hand-off, so
a flood of mentions cannot spawn unbounded work against the backend.
A .dockerignore is added because a disposable backend/.venv was being swallowed
by COPY . /app/ and duplicated again by the chown layer, inflating the image to
1.8 GB; it builds at 578 MB.
Tests: 29 Go gateway tests covering every behaviour the deleted
test_discord_bot.py asserted, plus cron/config/apiclient suites; 10 new Python
tests for the internal routes (fail-closed, auth, flag drop, per-job 409 guard).
Full suite 359 passed / 7 skipped; go build, vet and test -race clean.
Adds .forgejo/workflows/shell-lint.yml (pinned shellcheck v0.11.0 + sha256, -x,
default severity, fail on any finding, not path-filtered) and drives all 26
scripts to zero findings.
Two defects shellcheck cannot see:
render-secrets.sh left DECRYPTED vault contents in /tmp whenever a sops decrypt
failed -- the caller's set -e aborted the function before either cleanup ran.
Now removed on every exit path, with `|| return 1` on both sops calls so a
decrypt failure can never write a partial /etc/thermograph.env regardless of the
caller's shell options. Explicitly not a `trap ... RETURN`: such a trap set in a
sourced function persists into the caller's shell and re-fires when the caller's
next `.`/source completes, where the function-local tmp is unset -- fatal and
silent under deploy.sh's set -u. The file now records that reasoning.
autoscale.sh ran `set -eu` without pipefail while piping docker stats into awk,
so a failed left side was swallowed and the loop autoscaled on empty input.
Promoted to pipefail with a missed sample treated as a skip; verified busybox ash
in docker:27-cli supports it.
Also: capture-fixtures.sh's `jq . || cat` ran cat after jq had consumed stdin,
silently writing truncated fixtures; deploy.sh/deploy-stack.sh `# shellcheck
source=` paths corrected for the monorepo layout.
Steady-state usage of the Open-Meteo API is removed; it remains only as a dormant fallback. Geocoding -> local GeoNames + Nominatim; wind gusts -> Meteostat; history -> NASA POWER (curated cells seeded with keyless ERA5); recent+forecast -> NASA range + MET Norway. Plus a drift-check tool comparing NASA vs Open-Meteo. All keyless, no new infra. Backend suite green in-image (gate).
One root workflow set replaces the four repos' copies (deleted -- root-only
is where Forgejo reads them, and dead copies are a trap): per-domain
build-push with explicit image paths (emi/thermograph/backend|frontend; the
old github.repository-derived path collides in a monorepo), path-filtered
per-domain beta/prod/dev deploys, a domain-input reusable build check, a
single always-reporting PR gate (path-filtered required checks deadlock
auto-merge), a new infra-sync pipeline (host checkout + secrets render on
infra/** pushes), and ports of secrets-guard / ops-cron /
observability-validate to monorepo paths.
