2 commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Emi Griffith	702bcd920c	openbao: fix bootstrap so it completes on 2.6.x ... bootstrap.sh could not run to completion on OpenBao 2.6.1: - Release asset names were wrong. `bao_<ver>_linux_amd64.tar.gz` and `bao_<ver>_SHA256SUMS` both 404; the assets are `openbao_<ver>_...` and `checksums.txt`. The tarball is now saved under its real name and the checksum grep anchored to end-of-line, because checksums.txt also lists a .sbom.json and `sha256sum -c` resolves each line by the filename inside it. - `openssl rand -base64 32` appends a newline and the static seal reads the key file raw, so the service failed with `Error configuring seal "static": unknown encoding for AES-256 key`. - The audit stanza relied on the block label being the device type. 2.6.1 requires explicit `type` and `path` with device settings under `options`. Worth noting the intermediate state: with type and path but a bare `file_path`, the server starts and silently ignores the log location, which is the worse failure given a wedged audit device stops OpenBao answering at all. - `disable_mlock` is unsupported in 2.6.1 and warned on every start. - Nothing opened port 8200 and ufw defaults to deny(incoming), so vps1 could not reach the vault. dev renders on vps1, so this would have surfaced as a timeout during cutover rather than here. bootstrap-policies.sh installed beta's credentials as `deploy:deploy`, but vps2 has no `deploy` user and both environments deploy as `agent` (env-topology.sh sets TG_SSH_TARGET=agent@ for both; deploy.yml uses one VPS2_SSH_USER). install_creds also printed a success line after a failed chown: the call site wrapped it in `|| echo`, which suppresses `set -e` for everything inside the function, so it fell through to chmod and reported an ownership it never applied. It now removes the half-written file and returns non-zero. Corrects the isolation rationale accordingly — separate credentials buy audit attribution and a policy boundary against mistakes, not deploy-user isolation. Documents the 2.6.0 root-token change (HCSEC-2026-08): `generate-root` now targets an authenticated endpoint, so recovery keys cannot mint a replacement token and revoking the last root token before a second admin identity exists is a one-way door. Also corrects the runbook's `verify-parity.sh --all`, which cannot work from a single host given the AppRole CIDR bindings.	2026-07-30 19:47:22 -07:00
Emi Griffith	6bd07d33cb	openbao: add a dormant OpenBao backend alongside SOPS ... Phase 1 of moving the secret store to OpenBao. Nothing is cut over: TG_SECRETS_BACKEND defaults to sops for all three environments, so SOPS remains authoritative until an environment is flipped in a reviewed PR. The reason for the migration is one specific failure class. infra/CLAUDE.md requires that vps1 never hold prod credentials, but that rule is currently enforced by a caller-side shell flag (THERMOGRAPH_SECRETS_SKIP_COMMON) at three call sites. A fourth call site, or one by-hand render, writes both S3 keypairs, the VAPID private key, REGISTRY_TOKEN and the IndexNow/metrics tokens onto the Forgejo CI-runner box and exits 0. policies/tg-host-dev.hcl makes that a 403 instead: dev's identity cannot read the common path at all. Shape: - vps2 only, native systemd (not a container: a Swarm service is circular, and a plain docker run is one `prune -a` from gone), raft storage (2.6.0 deprecated the file backend), static auto-unseal so a reboot cannot block deploys, mesh-only self-signed TLS (not ACME — that would put DNS in the boot chain of the secret store). - AppRole per environment, CIDR-bound, 5-minute tokens. Each environment's secret-id is owned by its own deploy user, which is a boundary that does not exist today since prod and beta both reach the same root-owned age key. - Render still produces the same raw unquoted dotenv: Centralis compares /etc/thermograph.env textually and the Swarm entrypoint parses it by line. The backend dispatch in render-secrets.sh returns early rather than refactoring the shared write path, so the SOPS path stays byte-identical. Verified by rendering dev (12 keys) and prod (32 keys) through it, matching the live hosts. The duplicated write path is noted for consolidation once prod has been on OpenBao for a release cycle. The OpenBao renderer rejects values containing a newline or a shell metacharacter. /etc/thermograph.env is sourced by bash in six places, so such a value is a command-execution path on the deploy host; the SOPS path has always had this hazard and avoids it only because every current value happens to be alphanumeric. Also records that the age keypair is NOT retired by this migration: it is the backup encryption key for every off-box dump (ops-cron.yml:142,197, 30-day retention), so deleting it with the vault files would silently destroy a month of database recoverability. verify-parity.sh is the cutover gate — it renders both backends and diffs them, reporting key names and counts only, never values.	2026-07-29 21:35:20 -07:00