Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment --
"beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the
operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one
environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and
ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here:
vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV
(own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137)
vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one
TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups
desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment
Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in
infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md.
deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout,
branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service
prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing
distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it
disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and
deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box.
Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the
db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services
are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on
every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared
data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env
and LB config are untouched.
One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh
creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT
revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for
the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap
superuser.
Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently:
- CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and
also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what
once had the prod backup dumping beta.
- The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box
prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it.
- Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would
have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's
traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine,
and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay.
- ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH
target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to
75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now.
- Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on
vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of
unreviewed branches on a VPS.
Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map,
and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box
cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host.
Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security
rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put
a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the
database and the filesystem.
Two changes to how credentials are stored and distributed.
1. common.yaml now exists.
The renderer has always concatenated common.yaml then <env>.yaml, host winning,
and the README has always documented common.yaml with a checkmark. The file was
never created. So every value shared by prod and beta was duplicated in both
vaults, free to drift apart with nothing to detect it.
16 values move to common.yaml: VAPID keypair, metrics token, IndexNow key,
REGISTRY_TOKEN, the S3 endpoint/bucket and both S3 keypairs, plus shared config.
5 stay per-host because their values genuinely differ (APP_CPUS, DB_CPUS,
DB_MEMORY, WORKERS, THERMOGRAPH_BASE_URL). 8 exist only on prod — the Discord
and mail credentials, which beta does not have at all.
Three more are held back deliberately despite being identical today:
POSTGRES_PASSWORD, THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET, THERMOGRAPH_DATABASE_URL. These are
the credentials that let one environment act as another, and beta is the more
exposed box — it serves public Forgejo and Grafana. They match only because beta
was seeded from prod. Keeping them per-host costs one line each and preserves
the ability to diverge; putting them in common.yaml would encode the equivalence
as intentional and make breaking it a migration rather than an edit. Reasoning
recorded in the vault README, since a future reader will otherwise "fix" it.
Done without any plaintext leaving prod: ciphertext was shipped up, decrypted
against the host's age key, recombined, re-encrypted, and shipped back. The
consolidation refuses to write unless it has proved merged(common + env) equals
the original env vault exactly — same keys, same values — and re-verifies from
the written files afterwards. Both checks passed for prod and beta.
2. render_thermograph_secrets no longer fails open.
One `return 0` covered two different situations: "this host is not configured
for SOPS" (true of the LAN dev box, and correct to succeed) and "this host IS
configured but its vault is not where we looked". The second is a failure, and
returning 0 made it a silent no-op wearing a success code — a deploy would
report success having rendered nothing, and the host would keep serving whatever
/etc/thermograph.env already held, including after a rotation.
The likely cause is passing the wrong root: the function wants the directory
containing deploy/secrets, which on the hosts is /opt/thermograph/infra, not
/opt/thermograph. That mistake looked exactly like "not configured here", which
is why it went unnoticed. It now exits 1 and names the probable cause.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
Prod DB dumps and Forgejo (db + data volume) are now copied off-box to the
era5-thermograph S3 bucket, age-encrypted to the vault recipient so the host
age key at /etc/thermograph/age.key decrypts them for restore. Nothing plaintext
leaves the box; no local intermediate (streamed via age | rclone rcat).
ops-cron: the prod pg_dump job gains an off-box push; a new forgejo-backup job
dumps Forgejo's Postgres + tars its data volume on beta (the git host had NO
backup at all). 30-day off-box retention on both. S3 creds are Forgejo Actions
secrets (S3_ENDPOINT/BUCKET/ACCESS_KEY/SECRET_KEY), mirrored into the SOPS vault
(prod.yaml/beta.yaml) for host-side use. Contabo needs path-style addressing.
Adds deploy/backup/README.md with the DR restore runbook.
