#!/usr/bin/env bash # Render /etc/thermograph.env from the SOPS-encrypted source of truth # (deploy/secrets/.yaml, committed encrypted) — sourced by deploy.sh and # deploy-dev.sh, not run directly. # # The encrypted files are the single source of truth; /etc/thermograph.env becomes a # rendered artifact that the existing seams (docker-compose `env_file:`, the systemd # unit's EnvironmentFile, and entrypoint.sh's /run/secrets shim) keep consuming # unchanged. Common secrets + the per-host overrides are concatenated with the host # file LAST, so a host value wins (env_file and `source` both take the last # occurrence of a duplicate key). # # Presence-detected: a host is "configured for SOPS" only when it has an age key at # /etc/thermograph/age.key AND an environment name in /etc/thermograph/secrets-env # (prod|beta|dev). A host without them keeps whatever /etc/thermograph.env it already # has — so merging this is a safe no-op until a host is deliberately migrated. See # deploy/secrets/README.md. render_thermograph_secrets() { local repo="${1:-.}" # repo root holding deploy/secrets local key="${THERMOGRAPH_AGE_KEY:-/etc/thermograph/age.key}" local marker="${THERMOGRAPH_SECRETS_ENV_FILE:-/etc/thermograph/secrets-env}" local env_name env_name=$(cat "$marker" 2>/dev/null || true) # The per-host file is required; common.yaml is optional so the initial cutover can # seed each host as an exact copy of its live env (byte-identical render, no value # changes) and factor out shared secrets into common.yaml later. if [ -z "$env_name" ] || [ ! -f "$key" ] \ || [ ! -f "$repo/deploy/secrets/${env_name}.yaml" ]; then echo "==> SOPS secrets not configured here; using existing /etc/thermograph.env" return 0 fi if ! command -v sops >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo "!! sops not installed but this host is configured for SOPS secrets" >&2 return 1 fi echo "==> Rendering /etc/thermograph.env from deploy/secrets (common + ${env_name})" # The age private key is root-owned (0400). Read it directly if we can, else via # sudo into SOPS_AGE_KEY — so the key never has to be readable by the deploy user. # (The render needs sudo to write /etc/thermograph.env below anyway.) local key_env=() if [ -r "$key" ]; then key_env=("SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE=$key") else local keymat; keymat=$(sudo cat "$key" 2>/dev/null | grep '^AGE-SECRET-KEY-' || true) [ -n "$keymat" ] || { echo "!! cannot read age key at $key (need sudo)" >&2; return 1; } key_env=("SOPS_AGE_KEY=$keymat") fi local tmp; tmp=$(mktemp) : > "$tmp" # set -e in the caller makes a decrypt failure fatal here (no partial env). common # first, host second, so a host value overrides a shared one (last-wins). if [ -f "$repo/deploy/secrets/common.yaml" ]; then env "${key_env[@]}" sops -d --input-type yaml --output-type dotenv \ "$repo/deploy/secrets/common.yaml" >> "$tmp" fi env "${key_env[@]}" sops -d --input-type yaml --output-type dotenv \ "$repo/deploy/secrets/${env_name}.yaml" >> "$tmp" # Write /etc/thermograph.env. Prefer an in-place write when the existing file is # writable by us (e.g. a group-writable 0660 root: on a box whose CI # deploy user isn't root and has no broad sudo — beta's `deploy`), since that needs # only file write, not /etc dir write or sudo. Else install; else sudo install (a # root/agent deploy) -- and on that sudo path CHOWN the result to the invoking # deploy user (-o/-g $(id -un/-gn)), or the file lands root:root 0640 and the very # next line of deploy.sh (`. /etc/thermograph.env` as that non-root user) can't read # it, so POSTGRES_PASSWORD never enters the env and `docker compose` dies on # interpolation. Fail loudly rather than deploy against stale secrets. if [ -f /etc/thermograph.env ] && [ -w /etc/thermograph.env ]; then cat "$tmp" > /etc/thermograph.env elif install -m 0640 "$tmp" /etc/thermograph.env 2>/dev/null; then : elif sudo install -m 0640 -o "$(id -un)" -g "$(id -gn)" "$tmp" /etc/thermograph.env 2>/dev/null; then : else rm -f "$tmp" echo "!! cannot write /etc/thermograph.env (need file write access or passwordless sudo)" >&2 return 1 fi rm -f "$tmp" }