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Brings the last two credential stores under SOPS, so all three environments and the control plane are managed the same way. dev.yaml — dev was not "intentionally not wired in", it was broken The vault README claimed dev had no real secrets. Both halves were false. Dev needed secrets it did not have: thermograph-dev-daemon-1 has been in a crash loop, restarting every ~60s with "neither THERMOGRAPH_INTERNAL_TOKEN nor THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET is set; refusing to start" — so dev has had no Discord gateway and no job timers. With THERMOGRAPH_BASE_URL unset the app also falls back to https://thermograph.org, so dev's IndexNow pings and verification links claimed to be prod. dev.yaml gives it its own generated AUTH_SECRET and a real base URL, and 12 values total. And dev already held production credentials: backend-deploy-dev.yml injects S3_ACCESS_KEY/S3_SECRET_KEY into every dev deploy, and the only provisioned keypair for that bucket is read-write — on the bucket holding prod's backups. Dev does not need them; without bucket creds the lake service 503s and history falls through to the archive. Those workflow lines still need removing. dev renders dev.yaml ALONE, via THERMOGRAPH_SECRETS_SKIP_COMMON=1. Eleven of common.yaml's sixteen values are live production credentials, the render is a plaintext concatenation consumed through env_file:, and dev is the operator's desktop AND the Forgejo runner executing unreviewed dev-branch code with the docker socket mounted. An override in dev.yaml would not help — last-wins governs consumers, but prod's value is still physically a line in the file. Verified: current renderer leaks 28 lines onto dev including both S3 keypairs and the VAPID private key; patched gives exactly 12 keys and no prod credential. Beta's render is byte-identical either way. centralis.prod.yaml — its own file, its own renderer /etc/centralis.env was hand-edited, which is how a JSON registry got written unquoted into a shell-sourced file tonight and silently collapsed three identities to one. The renderer now owns the file. It is service- AND environment-scoped, not folded into prod.yaml, because /etc/thermograph.env is loaded into every container in the app stack. Folding these in would put CENTRALIS_AUTH_TOKEN and CENTRALIS_TOKENS — which authenticate an endpoint carrying run_on_host and sql_query(write) — into the web backend's environment, turning a read-anything bug in the app into a foothold on the control plane. Quoting is guaranteed three ways rather than assumed. Critically, `sops -d --output-type dotenv` emits values verbatim, so reusing the existing render path would have reproduced tonight's bug exactly. The new function decrypts to JSON and emits POSIX single-quoted assignments; it then sources its own output in a clean shell and compares every value before touching /etc; and it refuses to write unless CENTRALIS_TOKENS parses as a non-empty subject->token object after sourcing. Tested against 16 hostile values including embedded quotes, newlines and ;rm -rf /. Value-identity proven, not asserted: rendered vs live compared as *effective* values on prod (a textual diff would report a false difference, and would report a false match if the vault had captured quote characters as part of the value), plus both env files producing a byte-identical `docker compose config` digest. 9 keys, both token subjects preserved. Nothing deployed. Note for later: /etc/thermograph.env is also shell-sourced, and survives on raw dotenv only because none of its 32 current values contains a shell-special character. It is one quoted secret away from the same bug. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY |
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|---|---|---|
| .forgejo/workflows | ||
| backend | ||
| frontend | ||
| infra | ||
| observability | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| CLAUDE.md | ||
| CUTOVER-NOTES.md | ||
| README.md | ||
thermograph
The Thermograph monorepo — the split repos reunified (2026-07-22) with full history via subtree merges, while keeping everything the split was actually for: per-domain images, per-domain deploys, and an async FE/BE contract.
Domains
| Dir | What | CI |
|---|---|---|
backend/ |
FastAPI graded-climate API, accounts, notifications (Discord bot, push, mail), data pipeline | backend-build-push → image emi/thermograph/backend; backend-deploy[-prod|-dev] |
frontend/ |
Public client: static JS/CSS + SSR pages | frontend-* mirrors of the above; image emi/thermograph/frontend |
infra/ |
Compose, deploy scripts, terraform, SOPS secrets vault, ops cron | infra-sync (host checkout + secrets render), secrets-guard, ops-cron |
observability/ |
Loki + Grafana + Alloy stack | observability-validate |
thermograph-docs deliberately stays its own repo (ADRs + runbooks, no
build artifacts, different change cadence).
How CI stays decoupled
Every workflow in .forgejo/workflows/ is path-filtered to its domain: a
push touching only frontend/** builds/deploys nothing else. Images stay
separate (emi/thermograph/backend, emi/thermograph/frontend, each tagged
sha-<12hex>), deploys stay per-service (infra/deploy/deploy.sh SERVICE=backend|frontend|all), and the API version contract
(GET /api/version, PAYLOAD_VER) still lets FE and BE ship out of lockstep.
The one intentionally coupled piece is pr-build.yml: a single always-running
gate required check that builds only the domains a PR touches (a
path-filtered required check would deadlock auto-merge).
Branch model (unchanged from the split era): PRs → dev, main → beta,
release → prod; infra tracked via main on all hosts.
Before pointing anything live at this repo, read CUTOVER-NOTES.md.