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Environments stop being machines. Until now each box WAS an environment --
"beta" named both a deploy target and a host, "the desktop" named both the
operator's computer and the dev server -- so every path could assume one
environment per host and hardcode /opt/thermograph, /etc/thermograph.env and
ports 8137/8080. That assumption ends here:
vps1 75.119.132.91 Forgejo, Grafana/Loki, the portfolio site, and DEV
(own Postgres, mesh-only on 10.10.0.2:8137)
vps2 169.58.46.181 PROD and BETA as two Swarm stacks sharing one
TimescaleDB instance, plus Centralis, Postfix, backups
desktop AI model hosting + flex Swarm capacity, no environment
Nothing live has moved; the ordered cutover is in
infra/deploy/RUNBOOK-vps1-vps2-cutover.md.
deploy/env-topology.sh is the single source of truth: env -> host, checkout,
branch, deploy mode, stack name, env file, LB ports, DB role/database, service
prefix. THERMOGRAPH_ENV is the input, and on vps2 it is the only thing
distinguishing a beta deploy from a prod one -- deploy.sh refuses to run when it
disagrees with the checkout it was invoked from. The host-wide secrets-env and
deploy-mode markers survive only as a fallback for a single-environment box.
Beta gets its own stack file rather than an overlay (a merge cannot REMOVE the
db service, and beta having no database of its own is the point). Its services
are prefixed beta-*: Swarm registers a service's short name as a DNS alias on
every network it joins, so two stacks both calling a service `web` on the shared
data network would let prod's frontend resolve a beta task. Prod's stack, env
and LB config are untouched.
One Postgres, two databases with two roles: deploy/db/provision-env-db.sh
creates thermograph_beta (NOSUPERUSER, owns only its own database, CONNECT
revoked from PUBLIC) plus a <role>_ro for ad-hoc queries, and refuses to run for
the environment that owns the instance -- doing so would demote prod's bootstrap
superuser.
Fixes that co-residency would otherwise have broken silently:
- CI secrets are keyed by host (VPS1_SSH_*, VPS2_SSH_*). SSH_* meant "beta" and
also "the Forgejo box" because those shared a machine; that conflation is what
once had the prod backup dumping beta.
- The nightly backup dumps BOTH application databases to separate off-box
prefixes, and fails loudly on a missing one instead of skipping it.
- Alloy stopped deriving the `host` label from the node -- on vps2 that would
have filed every beta line as prod, feeding prod's alert rules with beta's
traffic. It is now derived per source, with a new `node` label for the machine,
and beta's log volume is mounted via a vps2-only overlay.
- ops/dbq.sh, ops/iceberg.sh and the secrets seed scripts derived their SSH
target and env-file path from the topology instead of hardcoding beta to
75.119.132.91 -- which is vps1's address now.
- Dev's overlay binds DEV_BIND_ADDR (loopback by default, the mesh address on
vps1) instead of 0.0.0.0: correct for a home LAN box, a public exposure of
unreviewed branches on a VPS.
Terraform's hosts variable is keyed by machine with a nested environments map,
and main.tf flattens (host, environment) pairs so two environments on one box
cannot share a checkout. Caddy's single reference config is split per host.
Docs, onboarding and the runbooks are updated throughout, including the security
rationales that co-residency makes false: separate SSH credentials no longer put
a host boundary between beta and prod, and the boundary that remains is the
database and the filesystem.
83 lines
4.5 KiB
YAML
83 lines
4.5 KiB
YAML
# The central observability stack: Loki (log store) + Grafana (UI). Runs on ONE
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# node — the monitoring host, `vps1` (75.119.132.91 / mesh 10.10.0.2) — because
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# vps1 is an always-on VPS with a public Caddy already fronting it. This is NOT
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# where the beta *environment* lives (that's vps2 now, alongside prod, as two
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# Swarm stacks) — don't let "beta" in older docs send you looking for Grafana
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# there. Every node's Alloy agent (see alloy/) ships logs here; agents on vps2
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# and desktop reach Loki over the WireGuard mesh, so Loki must listen on the
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# mesh interface.
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#
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# Deploy (on vps1): docker compose up -d
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# Grafana is proxied by vps1's Caddy at dashboard.thermograph.org (see README);
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# Loki is NOT public — it binds the mesh IP only, reachable to agents over wg0.
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services:
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loki:
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image: grafana/loki:3.5.1
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command: -config.file=/etc/loki/config.yml
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volumes:
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- ./loki/config.yml:/etc/loki/config.yml:ro
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- loki_data:/loki
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ports:
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# Mesh-only: agents on prod (10.10.0.1) and desktop (10.10.0.3) push here
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# over wg0. Never published on the public interface.
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- "10.10.0.2:3100:3100"
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# Also localhost, so the vps1-local Alloy agent and curl checks can reach it.
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- "127.0.0.1:3100:3100"
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restart: unless-stopped
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grafana:
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image: grafana/grafana:11.6.1
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depends_on: [loki]
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environment:
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# Primary login is Google SSO (below). The admin user is kept as a
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# break-glass local fallback; its password comes from the host env
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# (.env — see .env.example), never baked into the compose file.
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GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_USER: ${GF_ADMIN_USER:-admin}
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GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD:?set GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD}
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GF_USERS_ALLOW_SIGN_UP: "false"
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GF_ANALYTICS_REPORTING_ENABLED: "false"
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GF_ANALYTICS_CHECK_FOR_UPDATES: "false"
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# Served behind Caddy at this external URL (sub-path-safe cookie/redirects).
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GF_SERVER_ROOT_URL: "https://${GRAFANA_DOMAIN:-dashboard.thermograph.org}/"
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# --- Google SSO (OIDC) -----------------------------------------------------
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# Enabled once GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID/SECRET are set in .env and OAUTH_ENABLED=true.
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# allow_sign_up is FALSE: a Google login only succeeds if a Grafana user with
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# that email already exists — so this dashboard is locked to pre-provisioned
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# accounts (see README), not "any Google user". Redirect URI to register in
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# Google Cloud: https://dashboard.thermograph.org/login/google
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GF_AUTH_GOOGLE_ENABLED: ${OAUTH_ENABLED:-false}
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GF_AUTH_GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID: ${GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID:-}
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GF_AUTH_GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET: ${GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET:-}
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GF_AUTH_GOOGLE_SCOPES: "openid email profile"
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GF_AUTH_GOOGLE_AUTH_URL: "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth"
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GF_AUTH_GOOGLE_TOKEN_URL: "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token"
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GF_AUTH_GOOGLE_API_URL: "https://openidconnect.googleapis.com/v1/userinfo"
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GF_AUTH_GOOGLE_ALLOW_SIGN_UP: "false"
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# Match a Google login to a PRE-PROVISIONED user by email (the admin created
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# via the API has no prior Google-auth linkage). Without this, Grafana 9.3+
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# won't look up by email and instead tries to auto-create the user — which
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# allow_sign_up=false then rejects ("signup is disabled"). Safe here: Google
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# verifies email ownership and it's the only OAuth provider, so there's no
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# cross-provider takeover vector the "insecure" name warns about.
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GF_AUTH_OAUTH_ALLOW_INSECURE_EMAIL_LOOKUP: "true"
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# --- Alerting --------------------------------------------------------------
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# The Discord webhook that grafana/provisioning/alerting/contact-points.yml
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# interpolates as $DISCORD_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL. It is a secret (holding it is
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# enough to post in the channel), so it lives only in vps1's .env.
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# Required, not defaulted: a Grafana that comes up with an empty webhook
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# looks perfectly healthy and pages nobody, which is the failure mode this
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# whole config exists to end. Better to refuse to start.
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DISCORD_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL: ${DISCORD_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL:?set DISCORD_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL — see .env.example}
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volumes:
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- ./grafana/provisioning:/etc/grafana/provisioning:ro
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- ./grafana/dashboards:/var/lib/grafana/dashboards:ro
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- grafana_data:/var/lib/grafana
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ports:
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# Host-local; vps1's Caddy reverse-proxies to it. Not public directly.
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- "127.0.0.1:3000:3000"
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restart: unless-stopped
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volumes:
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loki_data: {}
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grafana_data: {}
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