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render-secrets-openbao.sh resolved the AppRole file to a single host-wide default, /etc/thermograph/openbao-approle — which is prod's. On vps2 that made beta's render authenticate as tg-prod, and tg-host-prod.hcl denies thermograph/data/env/beta, so beta could never render from OpenBao. It surfaces as `cannot read thermograph/env/beta`: the policy working correctly against the wrong identity. env-topology.sh exists precisely because vps2 runs two environments and one host-wide marker cannot answer "which environment is this". The AppRole path is the same question and had been given the same host-wide answer. It is now derived per environment alongside host, checkout, branch, ports and DB role, and the renderer resolves THERMOGRAPH_BAO_APPROLE, then TG_BAO_APPROLE, then the conventional path — the same precedence render-secrets.sh:44 already uses for the backend selector. Only beta differs. prod and dev keep the conventional path; dev is alone on vps1 so there is no collision there. Beta parity passes when the path is supplied by hand (24 keys = 8 + 16 shared); this makes it automatic. Derivation confirmed by sourcing env-topology.sh for all three environments.
228 lines
11 KiB
Bash
Executable file
228 lines
11 KiB
Bash
Executable file
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Bring up OpenBao on vps2 from nothing. Run ONCE, as root, ON vps2, BY THE OPERATOR.
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#
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# sudo bash infra/openbao/bootstrap.sh
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#
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# ============================================================================
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# WHY THIS IS NOT AUTOMATED, AND MUST NOT BE
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# ============================================================================
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# `bao operator init` mints the credentials that become the new root of trust for the
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# entire estate: the recovery keys and the initial root token. Those have to be
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# CUSTODIED BY A HUMAN. Any place a script could put them — a file on the box, the
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# repo, a CI log, an agent transcript — is worse custody than the age key this
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# migration is meant to improve on.
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#
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# So this script does everything up to and including init, prints the recovery
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# material ONCE to the operator's terminal, and then stops and tells you what to do
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# with it. It deliberately does not store it, mail it, or push it anywhere.
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#
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# Everything AFTER custody (policies, AppRoles, seeding, parity checks) is automated,
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# because none of it produces a credential a human needs to hold.
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set -euo pipefail
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BAO_VERSION="${BAO_VERSION:-2.6.1}"
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MESH_ADDR="${MESH_ADDR:-10.10.0.1}"
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SELF_DIR="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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[ "$(id -u)" = 0 ] || { echo "!! run as root (sudo bash $0)" >&2; exit 1; }
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hostname_now="$(hostname)"
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case "$hostname_now" in
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vmi3453260) : ;; # vps2
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*)
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# Refuse to bootstrap the secret store on the wrong box. Putting it on vps1 would
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# invert the estate's central security decision: infra/CLAUDE.md states "vps1 must
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# never hold prod credentials. It's the box that runs Forgejo, its CI runner, and
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# dev's unreviewed branch — the opposite of an isolation boundary." With a static
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# seal, the box also holds the key that decrypts everything.
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#
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# This mirrors the guard infra-sync.yml already has (commit 7583258, "refuse to
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# render dev's vault onto a host that is not dev").
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echo "!! this host is '$hostname_now', not vps2 (vmi3453260)." >&2
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echo "!! OpenBao belongs on vps2. Refusing." >&2
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exit 1
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;;
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esac
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echo "==> 1/7 install the bao binary (v${BAO_VERSION})"
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if ! command -v bao >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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# NOTE: checksum verification. provision-secrets.sh installs sops and age with a bare
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# `sudo curl` and no verification at all, which is a standing weakness (a compromised
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# release URL yields a root binary that sees every plaintext). Do not copy that here.
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# The checksums file is signed by the release; verify before installing.
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tmpd="$(mktemp -d)"
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base="https://github.com/openbao/openbao/releases/download/v${BAO_VERSION}"
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# Asset names are `openbao_<ver>_...`, and the checksums file is `checksums.txt`.
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# The previous `bao_<ver>_...` / `bao_<ver>_SHA256SUMS` names both 404.
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tarball="openbao_${BAO_VERSION}_linux_amd64.tar.gz"
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curl -fsSL -o "$tmpd/$tarball" "${base}/${tarball}"
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curl -fsSL -o "$tmpd/checksums" "${base}/checksums.txt"
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# Anchor to end-of-line and save under the real asset name: checksums.txt also lists
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# <tarball>.sbom.json, and `sha256sum -c` resolves each line by the filename IN it,
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# so an unanchored match fails on a file that was never fetched.
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( cd "$tmpd" && grep " ${tarball}\$" checksums | sha256sum -c - ) || {
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echo "!! checksum mismatch on the bao tarball; refusing to install" >&2
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rm -rf "$tmpd"; exit 1
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}
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tar -xzf "$tmpd/$tarball" -C "$tmpd" bao
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install -m 0755 -o root -g root "$tmpd/bao" /usr/local/bin/bao
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rm -rf "$tmpd"
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fi
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bao version
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echo "==> 2/7 user, directories, TLS"
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id -u openbao >/dev/null 2>&1 || useradd --system --home /var/lib/openbao --shell /usr/sbin/nologin openbao
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install -d -o openbao -g openbao -m 0700 /var/lib/openbao
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install -d -o openbao -g openbao -m 0750 /var/log/openbao
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install -d -o root -g root -m 0755 /etc/openbao
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install -d -o openbao -g openbao -m 0700 /etc/openbao/tls
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if [ ! -f /etc/openbao/tls/bao.crt ]; then
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# Self-signed, 10 years, SAN on the mesh address. Deliberately NOT from Caddy/ACME:
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# that would put DNS and the public internet in the boot chain of the secret store.
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openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -sha256 -days 3650 -nodes \
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-keyout /etc/openbao/tls/bao.key -out /etc/openbao/tls/bao.crt \
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-subj "/CN=openbao.thermograph.internal" \
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-addext "subjectAltName=IP:${MESH_ADDR},IP:127.0.0.1" >/dev/null 2>&1
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chown openbao:openbao /etc/openbao/tls/bao.key /etc/openbao/tls/bao.crt
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chmod 0400 /etc/openbao/tls/bao.key
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chmod 0444 /etc/openbao/tls/bao.crt
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fi
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# Consumers need the cert to trust the listener.
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install -m 0444 /etc/openbao/tls/bao.crt /etc/thermograph/openbao-ca.crt
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echo "==> 3/7 static seal key"
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if [ ! -f /etc/openbao/unseal.key ]; then
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# 32 random bytes, base64. Same protection level as /etc/thermograph/age.key.
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# tr -d '\n' is load-bearing: `openssl rand -base64` appends a newline, and the
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# static seal reads this file RAW. That one trailing byte makes the key neither
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# 32 raw bytes nor clean base64, so bao refuses to start with
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# `Error configuring seal "static": unknown encoding for AES-256 key`.
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( umask 077; openssl rand -base64 32 | tr -d '\n' > /etc/openbao/unseal.key )
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chown openbao:openbao /etc/openbao/unseal.key
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chmod 0400 /etc/openbao/unseal.key
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echo " generated /etc/openbao/unseal.key (0400 openbao)"
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echo " ⚠️ COPY THIS OFF THE BOX into your password manager before proceeding."
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echo " Without an off-box copy, a raft snapshot is UNRESTORABLE."
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else
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echo " /etc/openbao/unseal.key already present, leaving alone"
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fi
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echo "==> 4/7 config + systemd unit"
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install -m 0640 -o root -g openbao "$SELF_DIR/config/openbao.hcl" /etc/openbao/config.hcl
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install -m 0644 -o root -g root "$SELF_DIR/openbao.service" /etc/systemd/system/openbao.service
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# logrotate MUST use SIGHUP: without it bao keeps writing to an unlinked inode and the
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# audit log silently stops growing — and a wedged audit device makes OpenBao stop
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# answering requests entirely, which would block every deploy on the estate.
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cat > /etc/logrotate.d/openbao <<'ROTATE'
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/var/log/openbao/audit.log {
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daily
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rotate 30
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compress
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missingok
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notifempty
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create 0600 openbao openbao
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postrotate
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systemctl kill --signal=SIGHUP openbao.service 2>/dev/null || true
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endscript
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}
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ROTATE
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systemctl daemon-reload
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systemctl enable --now openbao.service
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sleep 3
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systemctl is-active --quiet openbao.service || {
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echo "!! openbao.service failed to start; check: journalctl -u openbao -n 50" >&2
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exit 1
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}
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# Mesh reachability for vps1. dev renders on vps1 and must reach this listener, but
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# ufw defaults to deny(incoming) and nothing else in this tree opens the port. Without
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# it, dev's render fails at cutover with a connection timeout that reads as an OpenBao
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# fault rather than a firewall one. Scoped to vps1's mesh address specifically: the
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# AppRole CIDR bindings are the real control, and nothing else on the mesh — the
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# desktop, the phone — has any business reaching the secret store.
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if command -v ufw >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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if ufw status | grep -q '8200.*10\.10\.0\.2'; then
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echo " ufw: 8200/tcp from 10.10.0.2 already allowed"
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else
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ufw allow in on wg0 from 10.10.0.2 to any port 8200 proto tcp \
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comment 'vps1/dev -> openbao' >/dev/null
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echo " ufw: allowed 8200/tcp on wg0 from 10.10.0.2 (vps1)"
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fi
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else
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echo " !! ufw absent -- confirm 8200/tcp is reachable from 10.10.0.2 (vps1)" >&2
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fi
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export BAO_ADDR="https://127.0.0.1:8200"
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export BAO_CACERT=/etc/openbao/tls/bao.crt
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echo "==> 5/7 initialise"
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if bao status -format=json 2>/dev/null | grep -q '"initialized": *true'; then
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echo " already initialised, skipping"
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else
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echo
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echo " ############################################################"
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echo " # RECOVERY MATERIAL FOLLOWS. IT IS SHOWN EXACTLY ONCE. #"
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echo " # Store the 3 recovery keys in 3 DIFFERENT places. #"
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echo " # 2 of 3 are needed to rekey or mint a new root token. #"
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echo " ############################################################"
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echo
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# -recovery-shares/-threshold, not -key-shares: with an auto-unseal seal, init
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# yields RECOVERY keys (which authorise rekey) rather than unseal keys. 2-of-3 here
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# is redundancy against loss, not separation of duty — there is one operator.
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#
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# These keys are NOT a route back to a root token on 2.6.x. OpenBao 2.6.0 replaced
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# the unauthenticated /sys/generate-root with an authenticated /sys/generate-root-token
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# (HCSEC-2026-08), and `bao operator generate-root` now targets the new one — so
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# minting a root token requires a token you already have. The deprecated endpoint is
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# off unless `disable_unauthed_generate_root_endpoints = false` is set in config.hcl.
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# Consequence: revoking the last root token before another admin identity exists is
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# a one-way door. See the ordering note in the handoff below.
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bao operator init -recovery-shares=3 -recovery-threshold=2
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echo
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echo " Press Enter once the recovery keys AND /etc/openbao/unseal.key are"
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echo " stored off this machine."
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read -r _
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fi
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bao status || true
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cat <<EOF
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==> 6/7 and 7/7 need a root token, which is NOT stored anywhere by design.
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Paste the initial root token printed above and run:
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export BAO_ADDR=https://127.0.0.1:8200 BAO_CACERT=/etc/openbao/tls/bao.crt
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export BAO_TOKEN=<root token>
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bash ${SELF_DIR}/bootstrap-policies.sh
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KEEP THAT TOKEN until the whole sequence below is done. On 2.6.x the recovery keys
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cannot mint a replacement (see the note above ${0##*/}'s init step), so a premature
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\`bao token revoke -self\` locks you out of an otherwise healthy vault.
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That script enables the KV mount, writes the policies, creates the AppRoles and
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installs each host's credentials. Then seed — on THIS box, where the age key already
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lives at /etc/thermograph/age.key. Per infra/CLAUDE.md a script that reads production
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secrets is not for an agent to run:
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export SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE=/etc/thermograph/age.key
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infra/openbao/seed-from-sops.sh --dry-run # check first: 16/12/8/16 keys
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infra/openbao/seed-from-sops.sh --all
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Then prove parity. NOT \`--all\` from one box: each AppRole is CIDR-bound to the host
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that legitimately renders it, so an environment can only be verified from its own host.
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# here (vps2)
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infra/openbao/verify-parity.sh --env prod # expect 32 keys
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infra/openbao/verify-parity.sh --env beta # expect 24 keys
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# on vps1
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cd /opt/thermograph-dev && infra/openbao/verify-parity.sh --env dev # expect 12 keys
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Only once all three PASS, and only after you have a second admin identity that is not
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the root token, revoke it: bao token revoke -self
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NOTHING is cut over by any of the above. TG_SECRETS_BACKEND defaults to sops for
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every environment in infra/deploy/env-topology.sh, so SOPS stays authoritative
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until you flip an environment in a reviewed PR — dev first.
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EOF
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