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Two changes to how credentials are stored and distributed. 1. common.yaml now exists. The renderer has always concatenated common.yaml then <env>.yaml, host winning, and the README has always documented common.yaml with a checkmark. The file was never created. So every value shared by prod and beta was duplicated in both vaults, free to drift apart with nothing to detect it. 16 values move to common.yaml: VAPID keypair, metrics token, IndexNow key, REGISTRY_TOKEN, the S3 endpoint/bucket and both S3 keypairs, plus shared config. 5 stay per-host because their values genuinely differ (APP_CPUS, DB_CPUS, DB_MEMORY, WORKERS, THERMOGRAPH_BASE_URL). 8 exist only on prod — the Discord and mail credentials, which beta does not have at all. Three more are held back deliberately despite being identical today: POSTGRES_PASSWORD, THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET, THERMOGRAPH_DATABASE_URL. These are the credentials that let one environment act as another, and beta is the more exposed box — it serves public Forgejo and Grafana. They match only because beta was seeded from prod. Keeping them per-host costs one line each and preserves the ability to diverge; putting them in common.yaml would encode the equivalence as intentional and make breaking it a migration rather than an edit. Reasoning recorded in the vault README, since a future reader will otherwise "fix" it. Done without any plaintext leaving prod: ciphertext was shipped up, decrypted against the host's age key, recombined, re-encrypted, and shipped back. The consolidation refuses to write unless it has proved merged(common + env) equals the original env vault exactly — same keys, same values — and re-verifies from the written files afterwards. Both checks passed for prod and beta. 2. render_thermograph_secrets no longer fails open. One `return 0` covered two different situations: "this host is not configured for SOPS" (true of the LAN dev box, and correct to succeed) and "this host IS configured but its vault is not where we looked". The second is a failure, and returning 0 made it a silent no-op wearing a success code — a deploy would report success having rendered nothing, and the host would keep serving whatever /etc/thermograph.env already held, including after a rotation. The likely cause is passing the wrong root: the function wants the directory containing deploy/secrets, which on the hosts is /opt/thermograph/infra, not /opt/thermograph. That mistake looked exactly like "not configured here", which is why it went unnoticed. It now exits 1 and names the probable cause. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0182KTMrsTHJc3TcewCatJFY
31 lines
3.6 KiB
YAML
31 lines
3.6 KiB
YAML
PORT: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:DygsjQ==,iv:9CQZ8qDFdUkfUDBdS5dpx79YqzXLzTS1KMafH8N8k8c=,tag:HtO18+gDgU+lfBhu6Zswmg==,type:str]
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REGISTRY_TOKEN: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:C7IHLfZvhNuzwy7TGl00u4gyj0YqEpScEaXW9VaE/uYMg51Wcr6oLg==,iv:BhBSppQ2xLRQm5u1DkFFAgB+EgKp7wYw2KlPDpdbUho=,tag:ZbCHYCY+EQg6AJwAr/J27Q==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_BASE: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:sQ==,iv:Pop6S2qU0o2+2xMKWQD2P3Vjdh4rUafWF7o2/k8b6fw=,tag:NTJKCX7hH0shrVzmTAYrkQ==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_COOKIE_SECURE: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:CA==,iv:TM6XiygrDQn2qps4lO6hY2ldjW8LWlO3D/R/DBPqvGQ=,tag:+thBT7fMzH+DigecgxF4CQ==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_INDEXNOW_KEY: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:XZEMMJfmrSjc/sKEePaigTqEkh3ob/E25R25DvOAWwY=,iv:fqdaegzG1Na0zW+UgOh92RS4FP22pxStdD1/Jq5DRjs=,tag:/8ORtVkGUWjqgGXG/xZHmg==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_LAKE_S3_ACCESS_KEY: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:5pL+8tZbs8TZ5ezJpkPUmMss0gLcte73lU+au/476Ws=,iv:ujU3G+rbPZQx/igg50GeIPQxqgd+szIsjc3AqGhGLBU=,tag:hrkgn2DPkmBGThlsdMplqg==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_LAKE_S3_SECRET_KEY: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:XG+6wizXMVVFixhqLhg72HoKw9kEmH+Tty8jYMycvVk=,iv:tNz/WrkMYip2QyAr6bRy6PaIee56ZZ64BELBgvidVT0=,tag:HiQ55DGbeDAOSF0vpNWpWw==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_METRICS_TOKEN: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:DmOZU3HWQTuoSvQMb7iPkClJbDH48NB3OcRIYRkqNz8=,iv:acgGh0w2mc5ZD7rB7m/GW3Awsx3RWK+02L6YkAv5Rw0=,tag:x3U9F0Dekw/r9euRMjVQAA==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_S3_ACCESS_KEY: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:hTSSUIfOlY0GYI8gZ7FcOi7c89iye0Ym73l4M22zkNk=,iv:aPdbXKb4pOqigo9J3a7oM3qTip6HQcHUQDlAwg6XfoE=,tag:C4p+Ob/iSElNdF4m9E+M7A==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_S3_BUCKET: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:vGJDaElN6JRUawlD55Vr5Q==,iv:4ZAQ5NXb9xuMN+qPspM17W6zm9NIDXLX9hTJ/etSL0E=,tag:Ss7xaUl+kOiVF7oDs9FiYw==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_S3_ENDPOINT: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:PtZg52Uu70Ndx7L/dRTCZTmqv80NXiohOg+gfrzG,iv:hKQTy3Twd5uWwnS4UIs9oqT4NzpYUWQxWO1lUqrzpAc=,tag:kYwYp58fxkzRe5yQPSXa3g==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_S3_SECRET_KEY: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:1xuZRaC4p+ZM/oFAUuGDZb6AAu2PbjFrHQY3zmczRpI=,iv:xzI24qlUOvYiThBLOue0odvopuxdHCwDlwI4JwiP9EU=,tag:yRS9GjGLBEYk/kZ6miFudg==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_VAPID_CONTACT: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:N9mPLx6Mcgqm5TlgqIMFhNuZsBZxVPXf3LplO9k+VA==,iv:y5+MLI0zC5Kb6pRdORTMVJ1iMMoFrVRfv99mKWMRjp8=,tag:7VvKCLU+1TJtQcHWlDwybg==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:hTxKlgPWeW4HGBf08SxdAdK+ce6T5Fl9f+5tSGV6WpS+za5EI3zsK8BgRw==,iv:l+omFaCyL2+PHWdchadkmED2gIAoj5T0u/Ltzaw8mok=,tag:AQ3wT/wD5JAouX1M+Tjjmw==,type:str]
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THERMOGRAPH_VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:bgtqZFfTzYz5llh/YhAyGwGtRedK3/ze8SAWj8YdldY6s4nt2F3XeTANVO2Y9+NzvXc16PB3WWPnYEzCxnrG2KciIeYpOYZMoPpGldENPBLJtLa76Ej9,iv:HuZ7XtlXIt4wyJ79k3IYjHfWrQp7lnak4uCspyzS4BE=,tag:uPZvba8LVugDy76pKat6TA==,type:str]
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TIMESCALEDB_TAG: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:3mDU/k5fx0894+E=,iv:/iw3BZPF3mZ9M3bFNJSTzP9t15YZWCJwzoVXYL9Vj9o=,tag:Y4ez3+XfLJN1PtJyZlJj+g==,type:str]
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sops:
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age:
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- enc: |
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-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
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YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBrdjgydDB2VWs3VjZ1TjUy
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dDQveXNKdGFkSDFrNXVMMmJKM2xtVThxWGswCjNxUjhvZ2NRYUJFQzcwaDFKL3dW
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OFZ0RjFBODBQcHJqYjBjSSsyZll2cTAKLS0tIHZlYjdqSVRKZEtmcHJKOU9UN010
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QWdpRENmTm5HaHRTNGJybTEyUkttN1kK7RTlbbT1u1EGE1IVykk576Tig2Bgm3Fh
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bncE6yn10QK5kVcF9dDvpQ6RbaG+ESpNZTnuhSL5PDqrKtjnsV0Iqw==
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-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
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recipient: age1xx4dzs0dxlwvkv9sjuqzsphl7lfrxannkfken374yu2qvvcte9sqzktqt2
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lastmodified: "2026-07-25T00:38:24Z"
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mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:C12PnFE7MO0Ge5dCAHCcyXh650hFtRuexl5d3DL0IqTf8nLyNtRJzrPyl9whIs+S3HulsXh3xJOwwPdg6aTqdCfGSQ4Kp5qV+OHxH9lfpHs2yH+exa/eX+7Khpjk0OfvX5beC0GSPpYf9c01buaUTWcIh3pJXpDMdqr+aLC+Zd0=,iv:6VeaaEEkWU5rdTHy75rc2emb2u/HmOmLzO11D38ZXHc=,tag:iGRevzdtqZF9kyH0wxqG3w==,type:str]
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unencrypted_suffix: _unencrypted
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version: 3.13.2
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