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web/app.py started two long-lived background jobs under a leader election: the
Discord gateway bot and an APScheduler. Both are stateful I/O loops -- reconnect,
RESUME, heartbeat, backoff, interval timers -- living inside an async web app
that also has to serve requests. This moves them into a single Go binary.
Go owns ONLY the stateful I/O. It owns no climate or grading logic: anything
needing data calls back into Python over a new internal-only HTTP surface
(/internal/discord/grade, /internal/jobs/warm-cities, /internal/jobs/indexnow).
Grading depends on polars and the parquet cache; reimplementing it in Go would
make the bot's grades drift from the API's, and the slash-command path
deliberately shares one grade builder so the two can never disagree. The grade
route returns gateway-ready JSON -- including the ephemeral-flag drop that
discord_bot.py used to do -- and Go relays those bytes verbatim without parsing
the embed.
Packaging: the binary is built by a golang:1.26 stage in the backend Dockerfile
and shipped in the SAME image, run as a second compose service off the SAME tag.
The daemon and backend share the /internal/* contract, so they must never skew
versions; one image makes that structural rather than a convention. Its
entrypoint bypasses entrypoint.sh -- the backend owns alembic, and two racing
migrators is a real hazard.
replicas: 1 in the Swarm stack is load-bearing. Discord permits exactly one
gateway connection per bot token; the pin replaces core/singleton.claim_leader
for this workload. update_config uses order: stop-first, since start-first would
briefly run two gateways. autoscale.sh targets ${STACK_NAME}_web only, so it
cannot scale this.
Security: the internal routes compare the token with hmac.compare_digest and the
whole router 404s when THERMOGRAPH_INTERNAL_TOKEN is unset -- fail closed, never
default open. Caddy only routes /api/*, /digest and /discord/interactions to the
backend, so /internal/* was never publicly reachable; the token is defence in
depth. The router mounts before the catch-all frontend proxy so /internal/*
cannot fall through to it. The daemon refuses to start without the token.
Behaviour preserved from the Python, with the reasoning carried into the Go
comments: non-privileged intents (no MESSAGE_CONTENT, so no portal review);
fatal close codes 4004/4010-4014 stop rather than loop; the bot-author and
self-author mention-loop guard; allowed_mentions locked to {"parse":[],
"replied_user":true} so a crafted query cannot turn a reply into an @everyone
ping; the first cron tick deferred one full interval rather than firing at boot,
since warm-cities already runs at deploy time; and no overlapping warm-cities
run, which would double-spend the archive-fetch quota.
Two deliberate improvements over the Python. A close intended for RESUME now
uses 4000 rather than 1000 -- Discord invalidates a session closed 1000/1001, so
the Python's default close silently defeated its own resume. And MESSAGE_CREATE
is handled on a bounded worker pool rather than an unbounded thread hand-off, so
a flood of mentions cannot spawn unbounded work against the backend.
A .dockerignore is added because a disposable backend/.venv was being swallowed
by COPY . /app/ and duplicated again by the chown layer, inflating the image to
1.8 GB; it builds at 578 MB.
Tests: 29 Go gateway tests covering every behaviour the deleted
test_discord_bot.py asserted, plus cron/config/apiclient suites; 10 new Python
tests for the internal routes (fail-closed, auth, flag drop, per-job 409 guard).
Full suite 359 passed / 7 skipped; go build, vet and test -race clean.
70 lines
2.8 KiB
Python
70 lines
2.8 KiB
Python
"""The internal token's derivation, and its cross-language contract with the Go daemon.
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The daemon (backend/daemon/) and this app must compute byte-identical tokens from
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the same THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET. If they drift, every callback fails with 401 --
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which reads like an auth bug rather than like the configuration drift it is, so
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the shared vector below is pinned on both sides.
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"""
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import hashlib
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import hmac
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import pytest
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from api import internal_routes
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# Must equal backend/daemon/internal/config/derive_test.go's sharedVector*.
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SHARED_VECTOR_SECRET = "test-auth-secret"
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SHARED_VECTOR_TOKEN = "4c3830b2158941ff52720d198b65f7924372a3a482b8da52540a4d9be38247ea"
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@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
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def _clear_token_env(monkeypatch):
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"""Both knobs start unset so each test states exactly the config it exercises."""
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monkeypatch.delenv("THERMOGRAPH_INTERNAL_TOKEN", raising=False)
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monkeypatch.delenv("THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET", raising=False)
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def test_derived_token_matches_go(monkeypatch):
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"""The pinned cross-language vector. Changing the label or construction here
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requires the identical change in the Go daemon's config package."""
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monkeypatch.setenv("THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET", SHARED_VECTOR_SECRET)
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assert internal_routes.resolve_internal_token() == SHARED_VECTOR_TOKEN
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def test_vector_is_actually_hmac_of_the_label():
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"""Guards against the vector and the implementation drifting together if
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someone regenerates the constant from the code it is supposed to check."""
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expected = hmac.new(
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SHARED_VECTOR_SECRET.encode(),
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internal_routes._DERIVE_LABEL,
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hashlib.sha256,
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).hexdigest()
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assert expected == SHARED_VECTOR_TOKEN
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def test_explicit_token_wins_over_derivation(monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setenv("THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET", SHARED_VECTOR_SECRET)
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monkeypatch.setenv("THERMOGRAPH_INTERNAL_TOKEN", "explicit-wins")
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assert internal_routes.resolve_internal_token() == "explicit-wins"
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def test_no_secret_at_all_leaves_the_surface_closed():
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"""Neither knob set => no token => the router 404s. Fail closed, never open."""
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assert internal_routes.resolve_internal_token() == ""
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def test_derivation_is_not_the_auth_secret_itself(monkeypatch):
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"""Domain separation: a leak of the internal token must not hand over the
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session-signing key it was derived from."""
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monkeypatch.setenv("THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET", SHARED_VECTOR_SECRET)
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token = internal_routes.resolve_internal_token()
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assert token != SHARED_VECTOR_SECRET
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assert SHARED_VECTOR_SECRET not in token
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def test_different_secrets_derive_different_tokens(monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setenv("THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET", "secret-a")
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a = internal_routes.resolve_internal_token()
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monkeypatch.setenv("THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET", "secret-b")
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b = internal_routes.resolve_internal_token()
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assert a != b
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