2026-07-22 19:20:05 +00:00
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# Dev overlay for the LAN dev server (deploy/deploy-dev.sh):
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#
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# docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.dev.yml up -d
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#
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# Split-repo adaptation: the monorepo's docker-compose.dev.yml (see
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# thermograph/docker-compose.dev.yml) overlaid a base file where backend and
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# frontend had `build: .` -- dev's whole point there was `--build` in place from
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# the working checkout. This infra repo holds no Dockerfile at all (each service's
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# lives in its own app repo, thermograph-backend / thermograph-frontend), so the
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# base docker-compose.yml already has NO `build:` for either service, only
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# `image: .../${BACKEND_IMAGE_PATH}:${BACKEND_IMAGE_TAG}` (and the frontend
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# equivalent) -- same registry-pull model as prod/beta, just pointed at a dev tag
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# by deploy-dev.sh. This overlay must NOT reintroduce `build:`; it only relaxes
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# resource caps and LAN-exposes a port, same as the monorepo overlay did.
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#
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2026-07-26 06:56:38 +00:00
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# Differences from the prod stack:
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# 1. backend is published on ${DEV_BIND_ADDR}, defaulting to LOOPBACK.
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#
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# This used to be a flat 0.0.0.0:8137, from when dev ran on the operator's
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# LAN box and the point was for phones on the Wi-Fi to reach it. Dev now
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# runs on vps1, a public VPS, where 0.0.0.0 would publish whatever
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# unreviewed branch is in flight to the entire internet — with no Caddy, no
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# TLS and no auth in front of it.
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#
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2026-07-26 07:49:43 +00:00
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# So the default is 127.0.0.1 — safe anywhere, including a laptop running
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# `make dev-up` — and on vps1 deploy/env-topology.sh keeps it there. Caddy
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# fronts the stack at dev.thermograph.org with TLS, HTTP basic auth and
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# X-Robots-Tag: noindex (deploy/Caddyfile.vps1). Loopback is what makes that
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# guard total: the site block is the only route in, so nothing reaches the
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# app without the password — not even from the WireGuard mesh.
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2026-07-22 19:20:05 +00:00
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# 2. frontend's port publish is dropped entirely -- dev has no Caddy to reach it
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# directly, so it stays compose-internal-only, reached solely through
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# backend's own reverse-proxy fallback (THERMOGRAPH_FRONTEND_BASE_INTERNAL,
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# see backend/web/app.py's _proxy_to_frontend in the backend repo). This
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# keeps the dev stack serving the one URL it always has, at :8137.
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# 3. The CPU caps are removed -- dev runs UNCAPPED (no thread/CPU limits), unlike
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# prod's backend=4 / frontend=2 / db=2 allocation. `!reset` drops the base
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# value (both the top-level `cpus:` and the Swarm-style `deploy.resources`
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# block the base file carries for parity).
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2026-07-26 06:56:38 +00:00
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# 4. backend/daemon/lake get a second env_file entry pointing at an OPTIONAL
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# copy of the render under $APP_DIR (`required: false`, so it is a no-op
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# when absent). It exists for snap-packaged Docker, which is confined to
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# $HOME and cannot see /etc/thermograph.env at all — not a permissions
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# error; the file simply does not exist as far as snap-confined Docker is
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# concerned, so the base file's env_file entry silently loads nothing.
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# deploy-dev.sh now produces the mirror ONLY when it detects snap Docker,
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# which vps1 (ordinary apt Docker) is not — there, dev reads
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# /etc/thermograph.env like beta and prod do, and no plaintext copy of the
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# render is written into the checkout. compose appends env_file lists across
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# overlays (last-wins on duplicate keys), so this stays additive.
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2026-07-22 19:20:05 +00:00
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services:
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backend:
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ports: !override
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2026-07-26 06:56:38 +00:00
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- "${DEV_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8137:8137"
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2026-07-22 19:20:05 +00:00
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cpus: !reset null
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deploy: !reset null
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2026-07-25 07:16:08 +00:00
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env_file:
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- path: ./deploy/dev-secrets.env
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required: false
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2026-07-22 19:20:05 +00:00
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frontend:
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ports: !reset null
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cpus: !reset null
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deploy: !reset null
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daemon: move the Discord gateway and scheduler out of the web process into Go (#21)
The gateway bot and APScheduler were long-lived stateful I/O loops running
inside the async web app under a leader election. They move into a single Go
binary that owns ONLY that I/O -- websocket, RESUME, heartbeat, backoff, timers.
It owns no grading logic. Anything needing data calls back over a new
internal-only surface (/internal/discord/grade, /internal/jobs/*). Grading
depends on polars and the parquet cache; reimplementing it in Go would let the
bot's grades drift from the API's. The grade route returns gateway-ready JSON
and Go relays the bytes verbatim.
The binary ships in the backend image and runs as a second compose service off
the same tag, so the two ends of the /internal/* contract can never skew.
deploy.sh rolls daemon alongside backend -- without that the service would never
be created, since a single-service deploy uses --no-deps. It also probes the
image first and skips the daemon when rolling a tag that predates the binary:
infra tracks main while image tags are env-staged, so a host can legitimately be
asked to roll an older backend image, and creating the service anyway would
leave a container crash-looping on a missing binary.
replicas: 1 with order: stop-first replaces the leader election -- Discord
permits one gateway connection per bot token.
THERMOGRAPH_INTERNAL_TOKEN is optional: both ends derive it from
THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET via HMAC under a domain-separation label, so this needs
no new vault entry. The derivation is pinned to a shared cross-language test
vector asserted on both sides, so drift fails CI instead of 401ing every call.
Fail closed when neither secret is set.
Improvements over the Python: a close intended for RESUME uses 4000 rather than
1000 (Discord invalidates a session closed 1000, so the old default defeated its
own resume); MESSAGE_CREATE runs on a bounded worker pool; and a malformed HELLO
returns an error rather than a clean reconnect, which would otherwise reset
backoff and hot-loop against the gateway.
365 Python tests pass; Go build/vet/test -race clean; shellcheck 0 findings.
2026-07-23 22:49:54 +00:00
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# Same uncapped-on-dev treatment for the daemon; it has no ports to touch
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# (outbound-only in every environment).
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daemon:
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cpus: !reset null
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deploy: !reset null
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2026-07-25 07:16:08 +00:00
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env_file:
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- path: ./deploy/dev-secrets.env
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required: false
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2026-07-22 19:20:05 +00:00
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db:
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cpus: !reset null
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deploy: !reset null
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2026-07-23 22:32:13 +00:00
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lake:
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cpus: !reset null
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deploy: !reset null
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2026-07-22 19:20:05 +00:00
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# Uncapped memory on dev too (prod ceilings it at 8g). The Postgres/DuckDB
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# memory *budget* is still the ~8 GB derived by deploy/db/init/20-tuning.sh from
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# the default DB_MEMORY (raise DB_MEMORY to give dev more); shm_size stays (it's
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# required shared memory for parallel query, not a limit).
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mem_limit: !reset null
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2026-07-25 07:16:08 +00:00
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env_file:
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- path: ./deploy/dev-secrets.env
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required: false
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