render_centralis_secrets has existed since the OpenBao work and had no caller
on any deploy path -- only verify-centralis-render.sh, a check. A renderer
nothing calls is not a migration, it is a file. /etc/centralis.env has stayed
hand-maintained the whole time, with the vault holding a copy nothing consumed.
That gap is why turning on Google sign-in for Centralis had no safe home: the
only way to set CENTRALIS_GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID was to hand-edit the live file,
which is precisely what render-secrets.sh's header warns against.
THE GUARD IS THE POINT. On 2026-07-24 this estate lost Centralis' token
registry by writing a file missing a key the live one had. The renderer proves
its own output round-trips through bash, but it cannot know about a key that
exists only in the live file. So this job renders to a scratch path first,
compares KEY SETS (names only, both sides sourced in `env -i` so the
comparison is over what bash actually ends up with), and refuses to write --
failing loudly -- if the live file has anything the vault does not. Rendering
turns from a way to lose a hand-edit into the thing that catches one.
Verified the guard against a live file carrying a hand-added
CENTRALIS_GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID: correctly identified as a key that would be
deleted, write refused. Also verified the empty/unreadable-live-file path,
which needs `|| true` to survive pipefail.
It recreates the container where the other three jobs deliberately roll
nothing, and the difference is real rather than an exception: Centralis'
compose file interpolates /etc/centralis.env at PARSE time, so rendering
without recreating changes nothing -- the silent no-op this estate keeps
getting bitten by. `docker restart` would not do it either. One container, no
replicas, a two-second recreate. It also skips the recreate entirely when the
rendered file is byte-identical to the live one, so a no-op push does not
bounce a healthy container.
