thermograph/docs/onboarding/08-infra-secrets.md

# 8. Infra and secrets

`infra/` owns **how and where the already-built images run**. It never builds
app source. Hosts' `/opt/thermograph` is a checkout of this whole monorepo.

Read [`infra/CLAUDE.md`](../../infra/CLAUDE.md) alongside this.

## The machines

| Host | Public | Mesh | Orchestrator | Login |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **prod** | `169.58.46.181` / thermograph.org | `10.10.0.1` | Docker **Swarm** | `agent`, passwordless sudo |
| **beta** | `75.119.132.91` / beta.thermograph.org | `10.10.0.2` | **compose** | `agent`, passwordless sudo |
| **desktop** | — | `10.10.0.3` | compose (LAN dev) | it's your box |

```bash
ssh -i ~/.ssh/thermograph_agent_ed25519 agent@169.58.46.181   # prod
ssh -i ~/.ssh/thermograph_agent_ed25519 agent@75.119.132.91   # beta
```

Beta also hosts **Forgejo** (git + CI + registry) and **Grafana + Loki**, which
is why beta is guarded as strictly as prod: a destructive command there takes
out git, CI and the registry at once. The LAN dev box is deliberately
unguarded.

Every root-effective command on the VPSes is logged by `auditd`
(`ausearch -k agentcmd`). That's a feature — fixes are attributable.

Prefer Centralis for routine work (`run_on_host`, `fleet_status`,
`deployed_version`) over raw SSH.

## The two orchestrators

Which path a host takes is decided by **`/etc/thermograph/deploy-mode`**: the
string `stack` makes `deploy.sh` exec `deploy/stack/deploy-stack.sh`; anything
else is compose. The workflows never need to know which mode a host runs.

| | compose (beta, LAN dev) | Swarm (prod) |
|---|---|---|
| File | `infra/docker-compose.yml` | `infra/deploy/stack/thermograph-stack.yml` |
| Services | `db`, `backend`, `lake`, `daemon`, `frontend` | `db`, `web`, `worker`, `lake`, `daemon`, `frontend`, `autoscaler`, `autoscaler-lake` |
| Rolling | `up -d --no-deps <targets>` | start-first, health-gated, auto-rollback |
| Tag file | `deploy/.image-tags.env` | `deploy/.stack-image-tags.env` |

Note prod splits `backend` into **`web`** and **`worker`** (the
`THERMOGRAPH_ROLE` split from [04](04-backend.md)); compose runs one `backend`
service in role `all`.

`STACK_TEST=1` rehearses the entire Swarm deploy under stack name
`thermograph-test` on throwaway volumes and ports `18137`/`18080`. Leftover
`thermograph-test_*` containers in logs are rehearsal residue — ignore them.

### The volume/project-name coupling

Compose creates `thermograph_pgdata` / `_appdata` / `_applogs`; the Swarm stack
declares those exact names as `external: true` at the same mount paths. That
coupling is why `name: thermograph` is pinned in the compose file — running
compose from `infra/` without it derives project `infra`, silently creating a
whole new stack with empty volumes beside the running one. `deploy-dev.sh`
exports `COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME=thermograph-dev` (env wins over the file key) to
keep LAN dev separate on purpose. **Keep both halves.**

## `deploy/deploy.sh` — read this before you touch a deploy

Single entry point for beta and prod. Contract:

```bash
SERVICE=backend  BACKEND_IMAGE_TAG=sha-<12hex>  /opt/thermograph/infra/deploy/deploy.sh
SERVICE=frontend FRONTEND_IMAGE_TAG=sha-<12hex> /opt/thermograph/infra/deploy/deploy.sh
SERVICE=all BACKEND_IMAGE_TAG=sha-<a> FRONTEND_IMAGE_TAG=sha-<b> …/deploy.sh
```

What it does, in order, and why each step is the way it is:

1. **`flock` on `deploy/.deploy.lock`**, with a self re-exec so the lock spans
   the whole run. Backend and frontend deploys can fire for the same push
   seconds apart and both SSH into one checkout; concurrent runs race the git
   reset, the compose project and the tag file. `-w 600` bounds the wait.
2. **Render secrets** from the SOPS vault into `/etc/thermograph.env`, then
   source it, so a by-hand run interpolates the same as the systemd unit does.
   Guarded on the helper's existence so the very deploy that *introduces*
   `render-secrets.sh` is safe.
3. **`git reset --hard origin/$BRANCH`** on the checkout root (`BRANCH` defaults
   to `main`). ⚠️ **Uncommitted edits in `/opt/thermograph` evaporate here.**
   The one exception is `deploy/.image-tags.env`, untracked on purpose.
4. **Read `.image-tags.env`** so a single-service roll re-renders compose with
   *both* services' real tags and never accidentally recreates or downgrades the
   sibling.
5. **Registry login** only if `REGISTRY_TOKEN` is set. The CI paths don't pass
   one — the host is already `docker login`ed — and an unconditional login with
   an empty token would abort under `set -e`.
6. **Pull, with a bounded ~5-minute retry.** `build-push.yml` is a *separate*
   workflow triggered by the same push, and Forgejo's `needs:` only orders jobs
   within one file. A deploy racing ahead of its build and failing "not found"
   is confirmed-live behaviour; the retry covers a normal build and still fails
   loudly on a genuine problem.
7. **Daemon capability probe.** Infra tracks `main` while image tags are
   env-staged, so a host can legitimately be asked to roll a backend image older
   than the compose file — one built before the daemon binary existed. The
   script `docker run`s the image to test for `/usr/local/bin/thermograph-daemon`
   and drops `daemon` from this run if it's absent, rather than leaving a
   container crash-looping on a missing binary.
8. **Roll.** `TARGETS` are `backend → (backend, lake, daemon)`,
   `frontend → (frontend)`, `all → everything`. **`daemon` and `lake` ride with
   `backend` and are never targets on their own** — all three run the same image
   at the same tag, and rolling one without the others is exactly the version
   skew the `/internal/*` contract has no negotiation for. Single-service rolls
   use `--no-deps`; a full `all` uses `--remove-orphans` (a renamed-away
   service's old container would otherwise squat its port — confirmed live).
9. **Write `.image-tags.env`** *after* `up`, so a failed pull never records a
   tag that isn't running.
10. **Health check** (backend 8137, frontend 8080), then detached city warming.

### Rollback

Rollback is redeploying the previous image tag. But **do not treat image
retention as a rollback guarantee**: both `deploy.sh` and `deploy-stack.sh`
*end* by deleting images outside the running pair. On beta that succeeds, so
beta typically holds **no local rollback target at all**; on prod it usually
fails only because Swarm's stopped task containers still hold references, which
is why prod keeps a handful. Verify the target tag is actually present before
promising a rollback — Centralis's `rollback_to(dry_run: true)` checks both host
and registry.

`docker system prune -a` on a live box is forbidden for the same reason.
`docker image prune -f` (dangling only) is the safe form.

## Secrets — the SOPS + age vault

**The single source of truth is `infra/deploy/secrets/*.yaml`**, committed
encrypted (values only — keys stay readable so diffs mean something) and
rendered into `/etc/thermograph.env` at deploy time by
`deploy/render-secrets.sh`.

**Cycling a key is: edit → commit → deploy.** No SSH, no hand-edited root file,
no per-host duplication.

| File | Holds |
|---|---|
| `common.yaml` | the 16 values identical on prod **and** beta — VAPID keypair, metrics token, IndexNow key, `REGISTRY_TOKEN`, S3 endpoint/bucket and both S3 keypairs, plus shared non-secret config |
| `prod.yaml` | prod's own — the three held-back credentials, sizing, `THERMOGRAPH_BASE_URL`, Discord + mail credentials that exist nowhere else |
| `beta.yaml` | beta's own — the three held-back credentials, sizing, base URL |
| `dev.yaml` | the LAN box's own, **self-contained**, 12 values, no production credential |
| `centralis.prod.yaml` | Centralis's nine variables → `/etc/centralis.env`, its own renderer |
| `example.yaml` | format reference / CI fixture (fake values) |
| `../../.sops.yaml` | which age recipients files encrypt to (plaintext config) |

The renderer concatenates `common.yaml` then `<env>.yaml`, so a **host value
wins** (last occurrence of a duplicate key). `<env>` comes from
`/etc/thermograph/secrets-env` on the box.

### Two design decisions worth understanding

**Three credentials are deliberately *not* in `common.yaml`** —
`POSTGRES_PASSWORD`, `THERMOGRAPH_AUTH_SECRET`, `THERMOGRAPH_DATABASE_URL`.
They hold identical values on prod and beta today, so by the mechanical rule
they belong there. They're kept per-host anyway because these are the
credentials that let one environment *act as* another: with them, a foothold on
beta (the more exposed box — public Forgejo and Grafana) is a foothold on prod's
database and prod's session signing. They match because beta was seeded from
prod, not because the two are meant to be one system. Keeping them per-host
costs one extra line and buys the ability to diverge.

**`dev` renders `dev.yaml` alone** — `deploy-dev.sh` exports
`THERMOGRAPH_SECRETS_SKIP_COMMON=1`. Eleven of `common.yaml`'s sixteen values
are live production credentials, including a **read-write** object-storage
keypair on the bucket that also holds prod's database backups, and the VAPID
private key that signs push to real subscribers. The render is plaintext
concatenation, so layering it would put all of those into every container in the
dev stack — on the operator's desktop, which is also the CI runner whose
`docker`-labelled jobs get the host socket, running unreviewed `dev` code. An
override in `dev.yaml` wouldn't help: last-wins governs *consumers*, but the
production value is still physically a line in the file.

Dev works fine without them: no S3 keys means the `lake` service answers 503 and
history falls through to the Open-Meteo archive (an accelerator, never a
dependency); VAPID and IndexNow both self-generate and persist to the `appdata`
volume; with no metrics token `/api/v2/metrics` is direct-loopback-only, which
is right on a LAN box. One `common.yaml` value is simply *wrong* for dev —
`THERMOGRAPH_COOKIE_SECURE=1` silently breaks login over plain HTTP.

### Working with the vault

```bash
sops edit infra/deploy/secrets/beta.yaml     # never a plain editor
infra/deploy/secrets/dry-run-render.sh       # preview a render
```

- **Never hand-edit `/etc/thermograph.env`** — it's a rendered artifact,
  overwritten on the next deploy.
- **Never paste a plaintext secret onto a box.**
- `secrets-guard` CI rejects a plaintext commit; the repo's `secrets-guard.sh`
  hook blocks a direct Write/Edit to those files locally.
- `deploy/secrets/seed-from-live.sh` reads production secrets and is **not**
  for an agent to run.
- The **`key-gaps`** skill audits which keys are missing or drifting across
  environments. It reads key *names* only, never values.

There's a cautionary tale in `deploy/secrets/README.md` worth reading: Centralis
was hand-configured until a hand-edit wrote `CENTRALIS_TOKENS` as bare JSON into
a file that gets `source`d, bash stripped the quotes, and Centralis — correctly
failing closed on malformed JSON — dropped to a single identity. Nothing logged
an error. It looked exactly like the file had never been written. That's why
`centralis.prod.yaml` exists: the only durable fix was *a human stops writing
the file*.

## Terraform

`infra/terraform/` provisions and configures hosts, SSH-driven.

> **Never run `terraform apply` casually.** No tfstate is persisted anywhere, so
> an apply would attempt full re-provisioning of live hosts. Terraform here is
> **executable documentation** until state is bootstrapped.

## Ops query tooling

Read-only, uniform across environments:

```bash
infra/ops/dbq.sh dev  "select count(*) from climate_history"
infra/ops/dbq.sh prod -tA -c "select max(date) from climate_history"
infra/ops/iceberg.sh prod -c "select count(*) from era5_daily"
```

Both exec **into the container**. No database is exposed over TCP — each listens
only on its private docker network, and prod's is a Swarm **overlay the prod
host itself cannot route to**, so `ssh -L` works for beta and is *impossible*
for prod. Exec works identically everywhere with no ports, no tunnels, no infra
changes. The prod container name is a Swarm task name that changes on every
redeploy, so it's resolved at call time via `docker ps --filter name=`, never
hardcoded.

Queries connect as **`thermograph_ro`** — `NOSUPERUSER`, granted only
`pg_read_all_data`. Read-only is enforced by Postgres, not by convention:

```
$ infra/ops/dbq.sh prod -c "create table t(i int)"
ERROR:  permission denied for schema public
```

Centralis's `sql_query` does the same thing with the same role. `write: true`
escalates to the app's superuser and takes effect immediately with no
confirmation — on prod, know what you are doing.

## Backups

The nightly `ops-cron.yml` `pg_dump` into `agent@prod:~/thermograph-backups/`
is it. Known gaps, stated plainly: **a single copy on the same box as the
database, no offsite yet**, and restores must handle TimescaleDB's
`continuous_agg` circular-FK warning (`--disable-triggers`). The `backups/`
prefix in the object-storage bucket belongs to those jobs — don't write outside
the lake's own prefix.

Next: [Observability](09-observability.md).